Re: [TLS] EU cards
Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net> Thu, 28 July 2011 19:25 UTC
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From: Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net>
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Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2011 21:25:20 +0200
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To: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com>
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Cc: "S.tefan Winter" <stefan.winter@restena.lu>, Martin Gaedke <martin.gaedke@informatik.tu-chemnitz.de>, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] EU cards
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On 28 Jul 2011, at 21:10, Anders Rundgren wrote: > Dropping HTTPS CCA, it will never leave the 0.1% slot anyway so > why would the browser vendor bother about how it works? This is where I disagree. It is not far from becoming the core authentication on the internet. Really really not far. It may be surprising, but I have explained in detail here why I believe such a counterintuitive thing. More here http://webid.info and on my home page. > > Now to the cards: Since > 1. readers is a non-standard item > 2. all cards need different middleware > 3. cannot be fitted with additional certificates > 4. is generally only trusted by a restricted group > 5. commercial CAs require certified RP SW, contracts > this is simply put entirely uninteresting > > The government cards are status projects. We have issued > x millions cards. That they are only used as physical ID-cards > is something they are slightly less open about... > > Banks in Scandinavia put eID on credit-cards which means that > every merchant get your SSN as well (if they want). > > As I say all the time: Google and Apple will make all EU cards look > like they always was: A pile of s--t. > > Anders > > On 2011-07-28 17:07, Henry Story wrote: >> Hi Peter, >> >> You may want to ask Prof. Martin Gaedke about this. He is working his way through the >> EU area on this and should have some good pointers on where these token cards are >> going around here. >> >> Henry >> >> On 28 Jul 2011, at 16:45, Peter Gutmann wrote: >> >>> Stefan Winter <stefan.winter@restena.lu> writes: >>> >>>> Banking: These days, TAN lists are going away. >>> >>> Is there any information on what's being done in countries like France, Italy, >>> the Netherlands, Spain, ...? The only place where it's really documented (in >>> quite some detail) is Germany (with surrounding/similar countries like Austria >>> and Switzerland using equivalent approaches), but what are other countries in >>> Europe doing? There's rather little information *from third parties, not the >>> vendors* publicly available on how e-banking is done in France, Spain, ..., >>> the pros and cons, how it deals with new attack types, and so on. >>> >>>> a) cell phone transaction numbers: >>> >>> The problem is that mTANs are vulnerable to smartphone malware, as Zeus has >>> already shown. It's currently a minor threat, but who knows how far the bad >>> guys will take it. On the whole though mTANs are a nice tradeoff, you get to >>> verify the transaction over an independent channel, and the mTAN is a >>> cryptographic hash over the transaction data so if a MITB tries to modify what >>> the browser sends it gets detected. >>> >>> Peter. >>> _______________________________________________ >>> TLS mailing list >>> TLS@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> >> Social Web Architect >> http://bblfish.net/ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> TLS@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> > Social Web Architect http://bblfish.net/
- [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication in … Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Paul Wouters
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Matt McCutchen
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Stefan Winter
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Blumenthal, Uri - 0668 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Blumenthal, Uri - 0668 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Wan-Teh Chang
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… t.petch
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex