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Re: [TLS] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Mon, 18 February 2019 03:29 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Sankalp Bagaria <sankalp.nitt@gmail.com>
CC: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "T2TRG@irtf.org" <T2TRG@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication
Thread-Index: AQHUxbWDTVzMaXNIX0ehxkA72mk1DqXjkZMAgADXCACAAMWwgP//rleAgABokwD//7SEAA==
Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 03:29:45 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication
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If a client will sign any challenge presented by any server, it open up a big hole.  An attacker can present a challenge that a (future) valid server will present, and the attacker, having the answer, can then act as the device to the server. For example, the attacker can intercept the server/client communication, present the challenge on its own, and then act as the client.

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