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Re: [TLS] [T2TRG] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication

Sankalp Bagaria <sankalp.nitt@gmail.com> Mon, 18 February 2019 11:33 UTC

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From: Sankalp Bagaria <sankalp.nitt@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 17:03:23 +0530
Message-ID: <CAPZZOTjrKB0WixXywV20fL+oEfQfbLDj=NuuGNFKFzEO+15XBg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>, rsalz@akamai.com
Cc: T2TRG@irtf.org, tls@ietf.org, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [T2TRG] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication
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Hi,

My apologies if I appeared a little aggressive in pursuing my incorrect
idea. I have to learn a lot.

Looking forward to your guidance in future also,
Thanks and Regards,
Sankalp Bagaria.

On Mon 18 Feb, 2019, 1:51 PM Eliot Lear, <lear@cisco.com> wrote:

> Just to add- this is what the plethora of BRSKI drafts are attempting to
> address in 6tisch, ANIMA, and EMU.  If there is to be a new mechanism, I
> encourage that it be listed on the GitHub page at
> https://github.com/iot-onboarding/catalog.  Both the README.md file and
> the Onboard-Table file should be updated.  PRs welcome.
>
> On 18 Feb 2019, at 04:29, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>
> If a client will sign any challenge presented by any server, it open up a
> big hole.  An attacker can present a challenge that a (future) valid server
> will present, and the attacker, having the answer, can then act as the
> device to the server. For example, the attacker can intercept the
> server/client communication, present the challenge on its own, and then act
> as the client.
>
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