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Re: [TLS] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Mon, 18 February 2019 13:30 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Sankalp Bagaria <sankalp.nitt@gmail.com>
CC: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "T2TRG@irtf.org" <T2TRG@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication
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Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 13:30:18 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication
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  *   Replay attack is avoided by using a challenge/ response pair only once. 2^32 combinations possible for 32 byte challenge.

How is that enforced?


  *   Server is authenticated by its certificate. An attacker will not be able to do so.

Did I miss where you explained this?

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