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Re: [TLS] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication

Sankalp Bagaria <sankalp.nitt@gmail.com> Mon, 18 February 2019 03:58 UTC

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From: Sankalp Bagaria <sankalp.nitt@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 09:27:54 +0530
Message-ID: <CAPZZOTh_YYkUj7qRQGVHHnXjETMYc+umTLOvvO5JGDFzapQcVQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
Cc: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, tls@ietf.org, "T2TRG@irtf.org" <T2TRG@irtf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication
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Hi,

Please see the comments inline.

On Mon 18 Feb, 2019, 8:59 AM Salz, Rich, <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

> If a client will sign any challenge presented by any server, it open up a
> big hole.  An attacker can present a challenge that a (future) valid server
> will present, and the attacker, having the answer, can then act as the
> device to the server.
>
Replay attack is avoided by using a challenge/ response pair only once.
2^32 combinations possible for 32 byte challenge.

Server is authenticated by its certificate. An attacker will not be able to
do so.

> For example, the attacker can intercept the server/client communication,
> present the challenge on its own, and then act as the client.
>

 MiTM attack is not possible since server is authenticated by certificate.
> An attacker will not have the private key of the server.
>
Thanks and Regards,
Sankalp Bagaria..

>

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