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Re: [TLS] [T2TRG] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication

Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> Mon, 18 February 2019 08:21 UTC

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From: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 09:21:00 +0100
In-Reply-To: <1EEEF408-9654-4D44-BF71-447B821F56E6@akamai.com>
Cc: Sankalp Bagaria <sankalp.nitt@gmail.com>, "T2TRG@irtf.org" <T2TRG@irtf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [T2TRG] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication
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Just to add- this is what the plethora of BRSKI drafts are attempting to address in 6tisch, ANIMA, and EMU.  If there is to be a new mechanism, I encourage that it be listed on the GitHub page at https://github.com/iot-onboarding/catalog <https://github.com/iot-onboarding/catalog>.  Both the README.md file and the Onboard-Table file should be updated.  PRs welcome.

> On 18 Feb 2019, at 04:29, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
> 
> If a client will sign any challenge presented by any server, it open up a big hole.  An attacker can present a challenge that a (future) valid server will present, and the attacker, having the answer, can then act as the device to the server. For example, the attacker can intercept the server/client communication, present the challenge on its own, and then act as the client.
> 
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