Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

On 17/10/17 16:46, Ion Larranaga Azcue wrote:
> The problem I see with a "server to third party" OOB look up or
> export of the keys is that the client will not be notified of this
> export taking place and so will lose the chance to reject
> surveillance...
IIUC, with the draft-rehired proposal, the client
can in any case not be told - the TLS protocol
extensions are mere politeness and the client does
not get to know what snooper(s) are involved, nor
can the client influence the snooping keys. Once,
any infrastructure for this was deployed, I think
it'd be used without telling clients for sure. (And
we would be fully complicit in helping that happen,
if the WG adopted this stuff, because we know that
such abuses would be inevitable.)

I think this WG was correct years ago when we
passed on the DNT proposal which had the same
"just politeness" aspect - the web is not really
such a friendly place that one can depend on the
kindness of strangers. Nor are many of the many
other applications using TLS.

S.