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Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00

Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Mon, 23 October 2017 16:43 UTC

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
Cc: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>, Paul Turner <PAUL.TURNER@venafi.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2017 18:43:25 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00
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On Thursday, 19 October 2017 19:12:11 CEST Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL 
wrote:
> If those middleboxes already have sufficient alternative options, why do we
> spend time discussing this draft? Why do we need to add yet another
> alternative for them?

so that they benefit from standardisation, network effects and be fiscally 
responsible!

</devils advocate>
 
> Regards,
> Uri
> 
> Sent from my iPhone
> 
> 
> > On Oct 19, 2017, at 13:08, Paul Turner <PAUL.TURNER@venafi.com> wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> 
> >> Subverting one CA cuts across a large scale of Internet traffic and might
> >> be
 noticed or can be routed around.
> > 
> > 
> > With respect to "be noticed", forcing clients to opt-in seems like it
> > would clearly be noticed. My understanding was that you were saying that
> > the middlebox could block traffic. That seems in conflict with your
> > statement that they can be "routed around". 
 
> > 
> >> Certificate transparency helps prevent a
> >> single CA from being coerced into misissuance.  
> > 
> > 
> > It seems like a middlebox that is able to deny traffic (has that level of
> > power, would simply use their own CA and force trust of that)
 
> > 
> >> With this extension, someone
> >> doesn’t have to coerce a CA or force victims to trust a new CA.  Instead
> >> they have to gain the cooperation of the origin(s) they are interested
> >> in.>
> > 
> > Gaining the cooperation of the servers (origins) seems relevant. If they
> > get the cooperation of the servers, they can simply get the data directly
> > from them. But, again, they also have to get the cooperation of the
> > clients. 
 
> > If a middlebox has sufficient power to block traffic, force clients into
> > opting in, and coerce servers into opting in, it seems like they have
> > sufficient alternative options that are of equivalent effort ("ease").
 
> > 
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > TLS mailing list
> > TLS@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls


-- 
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic

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