Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> Mon, 06 May 2019 17:51 UTC

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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 13:50:42 -0400
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To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"
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On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 1:45 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <
uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:

> On 5/6/19, 7:22 AM, "TLS on behalf of Hubert Kario" <tls-bounces@ietf.org
> on behalf of hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>     > Sure, and that was the really strange thing with TLS 1.2, why not
> just say
>     > SHA-2 or better only, rather than adding mechanisms that were much,
> much
>     > weaker than its predecessors?  So the simple fix is just to use
> SHA-2 only
>     > for TLS 1.2.
>
>     I don't know as I wasn't there when that was discussed, but one reason
> could
>     be the same as the problems we are facing now with RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3:
>     smartcards and HSMs that are limited to old algorithms.
>
> HSMs are more likely than not to support SHA-2. Smartcards rarely perform
> hash themselves, relying on the software that uses them.
>
>
>     Also, don't forget that signature_algorithms, at least in theory[1],
> was
>     supposed to also influence server certificate selection, and SHA-1 was
> used in
>     vast majority of certificates in PKI.
>
> Alas. Only in some (albeit large) enclaves.
>

Is this better suited for another (short) draft?

Best,
Kathleen

>
>
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-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen