Re: [v6ops] new draft: draft-taylor-v6ops-fragdrop

["Templin, Fred L" <[e-mail]>]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: David Farmer [mailto:[e-mail]]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2012 12:23 PM
> To: Templin, Fred L
> Cc: Nick Hilliard; [e-mail]; draft-taylor-v6ops-
> [e-mail]; David Farmer
> Subject: Re: [v6ops] new draft: draft-taylor-v6ops-fragdrop
> 
> 
> On 10/16/12 13:42 CDT, Templin, Fred L wrote:
> >
> > Why not just let non-initial fragments through and then forward
> > or don't forward the initial fragment depending on whether it
> > contains enough information in tlv headers to permit a filtering
> > decision?
> >
> 
> There are fundamental differences in the security threat models between
> a bank and a prison.
> 
> If what you are trying to do is prevent information leakage, things
> getting out, then the non-initial fragments could have valuable
> information that you don't want leaking, even if it is incomplete
> information.

Data exfiltration by an adversary at work within your own network?
Sounds like a good use case for Virtual Fragmentation Reassembly.

Thanks - Fred
[e-mail]

> Yes, encryption can deal with this issue, but were dealing with the same
> mentality that says you have to decrypt everything crossing the
> parameter to inspect everything going out or coming in.
> 
> In most situations I believe this is invalid reasoning, however I cannot
> say it is invalid in all situations.  I also believe the reasoning is in
> far more common use than the situations that actually justify it.
> 
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