Re: [websec] handling STS header field extendability

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Mon, 13 August 2012 22:10 UTC

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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2012 15:09:47 -0700
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To: "Hill, Brad" <bhill@paypal-inc.com>
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Subject: Re: [websec] handling STS header field extendability
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On Aug 13, 2012, at 2:31 PM, Hill, Brad wrote:

> tl;dr version:
> 
> EV is not a security boundary today in web user agents, it is a way to get a user interface decoration.
> 
> If we want to ask browser vendors to make it into a security boundary which they will defend, we need to think about a fairly complex and broad threat model.
> 
> I'm not convinced that:
> 
> a) it's worth doing LockEV unless it's going to be a real security barrier
> b) the complexity introduced in making it a real security barrier is worth it for such a rare attack

+1 to all that.

--Paul Hoffman