Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
"Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov> Wed, 08 January 2014 18:06 UTC
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From: "Igoe, Kevin M." <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
To: 'David McGrew' <mcgrew@cisco.com>, Sean Turner <TurnerS@ieca.com>
Thread-Topic: QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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Date: Wed, 08 Jan 2014 18:06:37 +0000
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Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG)
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We really need to make sure at least some of the mailing list has some expertise in a given area before we commit ourselves to working in that area, and anything with "quantum" in the name requires expertise I expect very few (if any) of the maining list possess. I suggest before committing to a topic we poll the mailing list to see who has both expertise on a given topic and an employer who is willing to donate the time and resources needed to follow through. > -----Original Message----- > From: David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com] > Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 6:07 AM > To: Sean Turner > Cc: Igoe, Kevin M.; cfrg@irtf.org > Subject: QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG) > > Hi Sean, > > On 01/08/2014 12:26 AM, Sean Turner wrote: > > My list is kind of short: > > thanks for sharing your top of mind list, it will help us to prioritize > work. > > > > > 0) Could the CFRG get behind these recommendations for RSA-OAEP/PSS > or not: > > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04481.html > > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04482.html > > > > If so, let's do a draft! > > > > 1) Assuming RSA goes kaput, it seems like we're moving towards EC (am > I wrong here) then are these EC-based documents worth saying more about > (e.g., in the next version of the protocol use this or run away in > fear): > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6979/ > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peck-ecdhpop/ > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact/ > > > > 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering: > > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt > > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt > > #0 and #1 are well worth discussion. For now, I will only comment on > #2. > > Quantum Key Distribution does not provide a solution to any problem > that we have at hand, and is not worthy of serious consideration for > extensive use in the Internet. > > The one benefit of QKD is that it does not rely on any computational > assumptions for security. However, it relies on physical assumptions > for its security; that is, it can be attacked at the physical layer. > This is a terrible tradeoff, since physical attacks are possible at any > point between the encrypter and decrypter. In addition, QKD requires > large amounts of raw entropy, and entropy generation is a harder > problem > in the real world than pseudorandomnes. (In other words: a QKD system > could use AES-CTR to generate the large amounts of unpredictable > elements that it needs, but if we trust AES-CTR, why not just use that > algorithm directly to encrypt traffic?) > > QKD relies on point-to-point secret keys, and it is inherently and very > severely limited in what data rates and ranges that it can support. > The claimed speed record the last time that I checked was one megabit > per second at 20 KM range. Using that technology, we need 10,000 > repeaters to get global scale communication. This would require the > pre-placement to 9,999 shared secrets between pairs of repeaters along > the communication path, and it would require that infrastructure to be > trusted. There are theoretical designs for repeaters that would not > need to be trusted, > > The idea of "hybrid QKD", in which QKD is used to distribute keys for a > conventional symmetric cryptosystem like AES, is a seriously bad idea. > It suffers from the physical layer vulnerabilities of QKD as well as > whatever vulnerabilities the symmetric cryptosystem has. It is *more* > vulnerable than a conventional symmetric system that uses the same > cipher for both traffic encryption and key distribution. > > QKD relies on the point to point transmission of individual photons, > and thus is inherently incompatible with wireless technologies such as > 4G > and 802.11. The photons used in WiFi have 100,000 times less energy > than those used in the fibre optic links of QKD, and WiFi is not > geometrically point to point. So even if QKD didn't suffer from the > problems described above, it would not be able to help the > 6 billion > cellular wireless subscribers, or the vast number of WiFi users. > > QKD is inherently unsuited for all of the important trends in > information technology, including the "bring your own device" trend, > Could, virtualization, and collaboration. > > I gave an invited talk at the 2012 HP Information Security Colloquium > Royal Holloway with the title "The Vernam cipher is better than quantum > key distribution", which presented an analysis that backs up the claim > in the title. The important observation here is that the classical > Vernam cipher, in which a long one-time pad is copied onto a portable > storage medium then used for information-theoretically secure > communication, is quantifiably better than QKD. Vernam does not have > any physical-layer vulnerabilities, it does not have any range > limitations, and it can be used over wireless. Its data rate will > depend on how frequently new pad material can be transported by a > trusted physical courier, but given the low data rates of QKD, a > courier > need not travel that often to match its data rate. The important > inference is: if we were actually concerned about the possibility that > all symmetric ciphers could be vulnerable to cryptanalysis, then we > would be pursuing Vernam-type information theoretic secure systems, and > not QKD. The reality is that there is no such concern, and interest > in > QKD is driven by its novelty, and not by any logical consideration of > what would be useful in information security. > > My talk isn't online (just mentioned but not archived > http://bristolcrypto.blogspot.com/2012_12_01_archive.html) If we need > to get these points understood more widely, we could publish something > on it. > > David > > > > > spt
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Trevor Perrin
- [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Sean Turner
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Henrick Hellström
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG David Wagner
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Henrick Hellström
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Henrick Hellström
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Dan Brown
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Max Pritikin (pritikin)
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Sean Turner
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Sean Turner
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Adam Back
- [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new… David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering… Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering… Sean Turner
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Sean Turner
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Max Pritikin (pritikin)
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Dan Brown
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering… Igoe, Kevin M.
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering… Igoe, Kevin M.
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering… Watson Ladd
- [Cfrg] DANE in the IETF (was: Re: considering new… Paul Hoffman
- [Cfrg] One Key -> RE: considering new topics for … Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering… Paul Lambert
- [Cfrg] ReL DANE in the IETF (was: Re: considering… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless Hilarie Orman
- [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum comp… David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG dan
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … David Jacobson
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … Yoav Nir
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … arne renkema-padmos
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … Igoe, Kevin M.
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless David Wagner
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … arne renkema-padmos
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Igoe, Kevin M.
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG David McGrew
- [Cfrg] 'key centric' architecture (was: Re: consi… Rene Struik
- Re: [Cfrg] 'key centric' architecture (was: Re: c… Richard Barnes
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG David McGrew