Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer

I believe there is a consensus on the mailing list for the RG to commit
to identifying public key algorithms suitable for use should advances in 
quantum computing make Shor's algorithm a viable threat. I agree with 
William that the transition should start before we are forced to do so. 
As JFK said, "The time to repair the roof is when the sun is shining".

Volunteers for authors greatly appreciated. No need to limit ourselves
to a single technology/draft this early in the process.

Any dissenting voices out there should speak up now.

-----Original Message-----
From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of arne renkema-padmos
Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 9:57 AM
To: cfrg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum computer

On 13/01/14 11:48, William Whyte wrote:
> I don't think you can say that just because there have been few 
> discontinuities in the security of algorithms there will be no 
> discontinuities in the future. There might be, and if it does happen 
> unexpectedly it'll be a big problem. It's not a problem we need to 
> work on right now, but, again, that makes this a really good time >
to address it.

It makes sense to have a fallback algorithm set, as ETSI has done with the 3GPP algorithms:

http://www.etsi.org/services/security-algorithms/3gpp-algorithms

They standardised both KASUMI and SNOW 3G with the requirements for SNOW 3G as fallback algorithm being:
* maximizing "cryptographic distance" from KASUMI
* minimizing potential vulnerability to algebraic attacks
See:
https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/ecrypt/courses/end/slides-28/8-gilbert.pdf

Cheers,
arne

--
Arne Renkema-Padmos
@hcisec, secuso.org
Doctoral researcher
CASED, TU Darmstadt
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