Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless
David Wagner <daw@cs.berkeley.edu> Mon, 13 January 2014 23:32 UTC
Return-Path: <daw@cs.berkeley.edu>
X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 488981AE1D8 for <cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 13 Jan 2014 15:32:20 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.935
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.935 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_SOFTFAIL=0.665] autolearn=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 5IQwJz4frUUt for <cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 13 Jan 2014 15:32:18 -0800 (PST)
Received: from out3-smtp.messagingengine.com (out3-smtp.messagingengine.com [66.111.4.27]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1C7EA1AE1B4 for <cfrg@irtf.org>; Mon, 13 Jan 2014 15:32:18 -0800 (PST)
Received: from compute2.internal (compute2.nyi.mail.srv.osa [10.202.2.42]) by gateway1.nyi.mail.srv.osa (Postfix) with ESMTP id 875C520FB1 for <cfrg@irtf.org>; Mon, 13 Jan 2014 18:32:06 -0500 (EST)
Received: from web2 ([10.202.2.212]) by compute2.internal (MEProxy); Mon, 13 Jan 2014 18:32:06 -0500
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed/relaxed; d= messagingengine.com; h=message-id:from:to:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding:content-type:subject:date:in-reply-to :references; s=smtpout; bh=bYY9WHVK53sHRMKsBVTgThZdOcc=; b=HOJjH 4SuhkpBmSetfnXDFRyxTFxf/XuULUU6u/IacS94ShMPTv7k9oamjG3z1e9w67LyP FJ94ycp93BdOfOotZ1FA3Sj2FP3plByuQ7n1YKgVDC7smbHUwCb/RBiwV6TcYL6d fK73TbJZTACOZBiovPP4t7AnxHtAGLNAGa33dI=
Received: by web2.nyi.mail.srv.osa (Postfix, from userid 99) id 4F758540382; Mon, 13 Jan 2014 18:32:06 -0500 (EST)
Message-Id: <1389655926.23536.70338753.20AC4DE5@webmail.messagingengine.com>
X-Sasl-Enc: IIjiCPPPmFgQm3o3Ds/XvGH5WFJ+xOEt6pLWTtG9iAC+ 1389655926
From: David Wagner <daw@cs.berkeley.edu>
To: cfrg@irtf.org
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Type: text/plain
X-Mailer: MessagingEngine.com Webmail Interface - ajax-064ceef5
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2014 15:32:06 -0800
In-Reply-To: <52CF3890.4010309@cisco.com>
References: <52C755AA.70200@cisco.com> <33E0BF53-A331-4646-B080-FD4F6E13916E@ieca.com> <52CD314B.2000604@cisco.com> <3C4AAD4B5304AB44A6BA85173B4675CABA9A1129@MSMR-GH1-UEA03.corp.nsa.gov> <52CF3890.4010309@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless
X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group <cfrg.irtf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <http://www.irtf.org/mailman/options/cfrg>, <mailto:cfrg-request@irtf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.irtf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/>
List-Post: <mailto:cfrg@irtf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cfrg-request@irtf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg>, <mailto:cfrg-request@irtf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2014 23:32:20 -0000
I agree 100% with David McGrew's message and recommendations for the group. I agree with his assessment of QKD; QKD is pointless. At present it doesn't solve any real-world problem we actually have. Also, all considered, I agree that it is not a good use of CFRG's time to develop QKD protocols or I-D's describing how to do QKD. Basically, I second everything David McGrew wrote. -- David On Thu, Jan 9, 2014, at 04:02 PM, David McGrew wrote: > Hi Kevin, > > On 01/08/2014 01:06 PM, Igoe, Kevin M. wrote: > > We really need to make sure at least some of the mailing list > > has some expertise in a given area before we commit ourselves > > to working in that area, > > I completely agree, the RG needs to be cautious about making sure that > it does not overcommit to work. > > > and anything with "quantum" in the name > > requires expertise I expect very few (if any) of the maining list > > possess. I suggest before committing to a topic we poll the > > mailing list to see who has both expertise on a given topic and > > an employer who is willing to donate the time and resources > > needed to follow through. > > I think I was not clear in what I meant, please see inline below: > > > > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: David McGrew [mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com] > >> Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 6:07 AM > >> To: Sean Turner > >> Cc: Igoe, Kevin M.; cfrg@irtf.org > >> Subject: QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new topics for CFRG) > >> > >> Hi Sean, > >> > >> On 01/08/2014 12:26 AM, Sean Turner wrote: > >>> My list is kind of short: > >> thanks for sharing your top of mind list, it will help us to prioritize > >> work. > >> > >>> 0) Could the CFRG get behind these recommendations for RSA-OAEP/PSS > >> or not: > >>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04481.html > >>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag/current/msg04482.html > >>> > >>> If so, let's do a draft! > >>> > >>> 1) Assuming RSA goes kaput, it seems like we're moving towards EC (am > >> I wrong here) then are these EC-based documents worth saying more about > >> (e.g., in the next version of the protocol use this or run away in > >> fear): > >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6979/ > >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peck-ecdhpop/ > >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact/ > >>> > >>> 2) Is QKD something we need to start considering: > >>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd-00.txt > >>> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ghernaouti-sfaxi-ppp-qkd-00.txt > >> #0 and #1 are well worth discussion. For now, I will only comment on > >> #2. > >> > >> Quantum Key Distribution does not provide a solution to any problem > >> that we have at hand, and is not worthy of serious consideration for > >> extensive use in the Internet. > >> > >> The one benefit of QKD is that it does not rely on any computational > >> assumptions for security. However, it relies on physical assumptions > >> for its security; that is, it can be attacked at the physical layer. > >> This is a terrible tradeoff, since physical attacks are possible at any > >> point between the encrypter and decrypter. In addition, QKD requires > >> large amounts of raw entropy, and entropy generation is a harder > >> problem > >> in the real world than pseudorandomnes. (In other words: a QKD system > >> could use AES-CTR to generate the large amounts of unpredictable > >> elements that it needs, but if we trust AES-CTR, why not just use that > >> algorithm directly to encrypt traffic?) > >> > >> QKD relies on point-to-point secret keys, and it is inherently and very > >> severely limited in what data rates and ranges that it can support. > >> The claimed speed record the last time that I checked was one megabit > >> per second at 20 KM range. Using that technology, we need 10,000 > >> repeaters to get global scale communication. This would require the > >> pre-placement to 9,999 shared secrets between pairs of repeaters along > >> the communication path, and it would require that infrastructure to be > >> trusted. There are theoretical designs for repeaters that would not > >> need to be trusted, > >> > >> The idea of "hybrid QKD", in which QKD is used to distribute keys for a > >> conventional symmetric cryptosystem like AES, is a seriously bad idea. > >> It suffers from the physical layer vulnerabilities of QKD as well as > >> whatever vulnerabilities the symmetric cryptosystem has. It is *more* > >> vulnerable than a conventional symmetric system that uses the same > >> cipher for both traffic encryption and key distribution. > >> > >> QKD relies on the point to point transmission of individual photons, > >> and thus is inherently incompatible with wireless technologies such as > >> 4G > >> and 802.11. The photons used in WiFi have 100,000 times less energy > >> than those used in the fibre optic links of QKD, and WiFi is not > >> geometrically point to point. So even if QKD didn't suffer from the > >> problems described above, it would not be able to help the > 6 billion > >> cellular wireless subscribers, or the vast number of WiFi users. > >> > >> QKD is inherently unsuited for all of the important trends in > >> information technology, including the "bring your own device" trend, > >> Could, virtualization, and collaboration. > >> > >> I gave an invited talk at the 2012 HP Information Security Colloquium > >> Royal Holloway with the title "The Vernam cipher is better than quantum > >> key distribution", which presented an analysis that backs up the claim > >> in the title. The important observation here is that the classical > >> Vernam cipher, in which a long one-time pad is copied onto a portable > >> storage medium then used for information-theoretically secure > >> communication, is quantifiably better than QKD. Vernam does not have > >> any physical-layer vulnerabilities, it does not have any range > >> limitations, and it can be used over wireless. Its data rate will > >> depend on how frequently new pad material can be transported by a > >> trusted physical courier, but given the low data rates of QKD, a > >> courier > >> need not travel that often to match its data rate. The important > >> inference is: if we were actually concerned about the possibility that > >> all symmetric ciphers could be vulnerable to cryptanalysis, then we > >> would be pursuing Vernam-type information theoretic secure systems, and > >> not QKD. The reality is that there is no such concern, and interest > >> in > >> QKD is driven by its novelty, and not by any logical consideration of > >> what would be useful in information security. > >> > >> My talk isn't online (just mentioned but not archived > >> http://bristolcrypto.blogspot.com/2012_12_01_archive.html) If we need > >> to get these points understood more widely, we could publish something > >> on it. > > Instead of the last sentence, what I should have said is: if there is a > need to better explain and/or defend the points outlined above, I > personally would be willing to spend the time to write them up. > > Speaking as an individual here: I don't think QKD is something worth the > RG's time. Post-quantum crypto, on the other hand, is something I > would be very glad to see work on. > > David > > >> > >> David > >> > >>> spt > > . > > > > _______________________________________________ > Cfrg mailing list > Cfrg@irtf.org > http://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Trevor Perrin
- [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Sean Turner
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Henrick Hellström
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG David Wagner
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Henrick Hellström
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Henrick Hellström
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Dan Brown
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Max Pritikin (pritikin)
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Sean Turner
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Sean Turner
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Adam Back
- [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering new… David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering… Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering… Sean Turner
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Sean Turner
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Max Pritikin (pritikin)
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Dan Brown
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering… Igoe, Kevin M.
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering… Igoe, Kevin M.
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering… Watson Ladd
- [Cfrg] DANE in the IETF (was: Re: considering new… Paul Hoffman
- [Cfrg] One Key -> RE: considering new topics for … Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless (was: Re: considering… Paul Lambert
- [Cfrg] ReL DANE in the IETF (was: Re: considering… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless Hilarie Orman
- [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum comp… David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG dan
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … David Jacobson
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … Watson Ladd
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … Yoav Nir
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … arne renkema-padmos
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … Igoe, Kevin M.
- Re: [Cfrg] QKD is pointless David Wagner
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … William Whyte
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … David McGrew
- Re: [Cfrg] likelihood that someone has a quantum … arne renkema-padmos
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Igoe, Kevin M.
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG Paul Lambert
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG David McGrew
- [Cfrg] 'key centric' architecture (was: Re: consi… Rene Struik
- Re: [Cfrg] 'key centric' architecture (was: Re: c… Richard Barnes
- Re: [Cfrg] considering new topics for CFRG David McGrew