Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US government possible? (was Re: Comments on draft-wouters-dane-openpgp-02)

Two years ago I would have thought the same. But today we are far beyond 
conspiracy theories. We are facing the biggest coordinated hacker attack 
in history of the internet. After what we've learned in the last year 
the US government has abused the trust of billions of internet users to 
gain control over the internet. We have no clue what other governments 
and intelligence angencies have done or might do. The former director of 
the austrian intelligence agency expects a lot of new disclosures in the 
next half year. Internet users worldwide are furious about the 
situation.

If we sell DANE as magic bullet without mentioning the trust anchor can 
manipulate the whole DNSSEC system and who the trust anchor is users 
will trust DANE blindly. If the trust anchor abuses control over DNSSEC 
this will blow up right into our face and harm the reputation of the 
IETF.

In my opinion we should mention the identity of the DNSSEC trust anchor 
in security considerations and we should mention the DNSSEC trust anchor 
has the possibility to manipulate the whole DNSSEC system.

Regards,

Renne

Am 2014-07-28 19:12, schrieb Olafur Gudmundsson:
> <chair-hat>
> This discussion is off topic.
> DANE is about how to leverage DNSSEC by applications and conspiracy
> theories are not within our charter.
> 
> Anyone that does not trust DNSSEC operations is free to ignore
> distribution of OPENPGP keys via DNS, and continue to
> use the web of trust.
> </char-hat>
> 
> 	Olafur
> 
> On Jul 28, 2014, at 10:59 AM, Rene Bartsch <ml@bartschnet.de> wrote:
> 
>> Maybe I misunderstood draft-zhang-ct-dnssec-trans-00 but I do not see 
>> how it would help. Consider the following case:
>> 
>> (Forced by secret US law) The IANA secretly hands over the current 
>> private key of the DNSSEC trust anchor to a US government agency which 
>> uses the private key to sign forged zones and feeds them to DNS 
>> resolvers. That way US government agencies would be able to manipulate 
>> any DNS record including OpenPGP while users would be lulled in a 
>> false sense of security.
>> 
>> In case I didn't miss any super-security feature users should be aware 
>> of that fact.
>> 
>> Am 2014-07-28 15:52, schrieb Paul Wouters:
>>>> 3. Security considerations: The IANA has control over the DNSSEC 
>>>> root keys. As the IANA is bound to US law, US government agencies 
>>>> probably have access to the DNSSEC root keys and are capable to 
>>>> manipulate the OpenPGP keys signed with DNSSEC.
>>> There is currently a first attempt at specifying transparancy for
>>> DNSSEC for those who want to audit/track the DNSSEC root or parent
>>> domain holders:
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-zhang-ct-dnssec-trans-00
>>> Paul
>> 
>> --
>> Best regards,
>> 
>> Renne
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> dane mailing list
>> dane@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane

-- 
Best regards,

Rene Bartsch, B. Sc. Informatics