Re: [dane] Comments on draft-wouters-dane-openpgp-02
Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Mon, 28 July 2014 13:52 UTC
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Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 09:52:09 -0400
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Rene Bartsch <ml@bartschnet.de>
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Subject: Re: [dane] Comments on draft-wouters-dane-openpgp-02
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On Mon, 28 Jul 2014, Rene Bartsch wrote: > I've three suggestions on draft-wouters-dane-openpgp-02: > > 1. email domain providers MUST provide a secure API/interface to customers to > provide a personal OpenPGP public key The draft document is the "secure API" to obtain records. The IETF is not an organisation that can tell domain providers what they must provide to their customers. > 2. MTAs/SPAM detection systems MUST check if the tupel "sender email address" > <-> "sender OpenPGP public key" matches and MUST reject the email in case it > does not match with signed messages to prevent address forgery and SPAM. These are security considerations that should be discussed for http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-usage-00 Note that I don't agree with the check you propose. I might be using a different key for my "default email" protection, versus a manually verified web of trust key. That is, my "default email" key might be online and auto-decrypt on my own server, while my "web of trust" key is completely offline- and I might not even want to publish it in DNS or elsewhere. Although I agree that anti-spam based solutions could surely taking signing into consideration in their determination of spam versus ham. > 3. Security considerations: The IANA has control over the DNSSEC root keys. > As the IANA is bound to US law, US government agencies probably have access > to the DNSSEC root keys and are capable to manipulate the OpenPGP keys signed > with DNSSEC. There is currently a first attempt at specifying transparancy for DNSSEC for those who want to audit/track the DNSSEC root or parent domain holders: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-zhang-ct-dnssec-trans-00 Paul
- [dane] Comments on draft-wouters-dane-openpgp-02 Rene Bartsch
- Re: [dane] Comments on draft-wouters-dane-openpgp… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Comments on draft-wouters-dane-openpgp… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Comments on draft-wouters-dane-openpgp… Martin Rex
- [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US government po… Rene Bartsch
- Re: [dane] Comments on draft-wouters-dane-openpgp… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US governmen… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US governmen… Nico Williams
- Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US governmen… Olafur Gudmundsson
- Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US governmen… Rene Bartsch
- Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US governmen… Wiley, Glen
- Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US governmen… Mark Andrews
- Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US governmen… Rene Bartsch
- Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US governmen… Mark Andrews
- Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US governmen… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US governmen… Rene Bartsch
- Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US governmen… John Gilmore
- Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US governmen… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US governmen… Stephen Kent
- Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US governmen… Nico Williams