Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US government possible? (was Re: Comments on draft-wouters-dane-openpgp-02)

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Mon, 28 July 2014 16:43 UTC

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Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 11:43:46 -0500
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Rene Bartsch <ml@bartschnet.de>
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Cc: dane@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US government possible? (was Re: Comments on draft-wouters-dane-openpgp-02)
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With CT the attacker has these choices:

 - compromise the target zone and its logs
 - compromise the target zone and be an MITM forever more and hope
that no one notices the logged changes

This is a significant improvement over the current situation, where
the attacker can be an undetected MITM when and as desired once they
compromise the zone.

Nico
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