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Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US government possible? (was Re: Comments on draft-wouters-dane-openpgp-02)

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Thu, 31 July 2014 15:10 UTC

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Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 11:10:36 -0400
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Rene Bartsch <ietf@bartschnet.de>
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Subject: Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US government possible? (was Re: Comments on draft-wouters-dane-openpgp-02)
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On Thu, 31 Jul 2014, Rene Bartsch wrote:

> It seems DNSSEC/DANE helps against most hackers and attackers but cannot 
> protect from attackers which have access to both the trust anchor keys and 
> routing infrastructure.

Whom do you trust? "No one" is not a valid answer. The best we can do is
audit/log the KSKs and do some kind of "N of M" verification that such
keys are in the public world view. Of course, that leads to small
outages during rollovers....

> Do the DNSSEC RFCs allow to distribute public KSKs of TLDs with resolver 
> software?

Of course. That's not so much a matter of protocol but of local policy.

Paul

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