[dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US government possible? (was Re: Comments on draft-wouters-dane-openpgp-02)

[Rene Bartsch <[e-mail]>]

Maybe I misunderstood draft-zhang-ct-dnssec-trans-00 but I do not see 
how it would help. Consider the following case:

(Forced by secret US law) The IANA secretly hands over the current 
private key of the DNSSEC trust anchor to a US government agency which 
uses the private key to sign forged zones and feeds them to DNS 
resolvers. That way US government agencies would be able to manipulate 
any DNS record including OpenPGP while users would be lulled in a false 
sense of security.

In case I didn't miss any super-security feature users should be aware 
of that fact.

Am 2014-07-28 15:52, schrieb Paul Wouters:
>> 3. Security considerations: The IANA has control over the DNSSEC root 
>> keys. As the IANA is bound to US law, US government agencies probably 
>> have access to the DNSSEC root keys and are capable to manipulate the 
>> OpenPGP keys signed with DNSSEC.
> 
> There is currently a first attempt at specifying transparancy for
> DNSSEC for those who want to audit/track the DNSSEC root or parent
> domain holders:
> 
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-zhang-ct-dnssec-trans-00
> 
> Paul

-- 
Best regards,

Renne