Re: [dhcwg] Citing 'draft-ietf-dhc-secdhcpv6' (rfc3315bis)

I have presented a use case (AERO) that needs DHCPv6 authentication but
not encryption, and I have stated that encryption will be incompatible with
my use case. Bernie mentioned another use case that will be incompatible.

As far as I can tell, AERO will be one of the most important use cases for
DHCPv6, and also as far as I can tell secdhcpv6 could easily be relaxed to
satisfy the need. So, drawing a hard line like this is essentially blocking an
important use case for no good reason. Is that really what people want?

Thanks – Fred
fred.l.templin@boeing.com

From: Lishan Li [mailto:lilishan48@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2016 8:40 PM
To: Bernie Volz (volz) <volz@cisco.com>
Cc: Templin, Fred L <Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com>; <dhcwg@ietf.org> <dhcwg@ietf.org>; Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>; 神明達哉 <jinmei@wide.ad.jp>
Subject: Re: [dhcwg] Citing 'draft-ietf-dhc-secdhcpv6' (rfc3315bis)

Hi, Fred,

In the Applicability part of secure DHCPv6, it is stated that: secure DHCPv6 is applicable in any environment where physical security on the link is not assured and attacks on DHCPv6 are a concern.
In addition, after the discussion in Yokohama, we have reached a consensus that: Given the focus on pervasive monitoring, all encrypting is the correct direction.

Best Regards,
Lishan

2016-08-24 5:55 GMT+08:00 Bernie Volz (volz) <volz@cisco.com<mailto:volz@cisco.com>>:
My point is that we will need to develop a solution for this (i.e. something like the referenced draft); not that this should change sedhcpv6 work.

Given the focus on pervasive monitoring, encrypting is the correct direction.

- Bernie (from iPhone)

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 1:15 PM, Templin, Fred L <Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com<mailto:Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com>> wrote:
>
> Hi Bernie,
>
>> Note that encryption will cause significant issues for DOCSIS and likely other deployments where the relay currently snoops the traffic.
>
> This is exactly the case for AERO, i.e., the relay snoops the traffic which
> must be available in the clear.
>
> So, authentication-only is what is needed. And, it does not need to have
> anything added to the spec - only a relaxation of what is already there.
>
> Thanks - Fred
> fred.l.templin@boeing.com<mailto:fred.l.templin@boeing.com>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Bernie Volz (volz) [mailto:volz@cisco.com<mailto:volz@cisco.com>]
>> Sent: Friday, August 19, 2016 6:38 AM
>> To: 神明達哉 <jinmei@wide.ad.jp<mailto:jinmei@wide.ad.jp>>; Templin, Fred L <Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com<mailto:Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com>>
>> Cc: <dhcwg@ietf.org<mailto:dhcwg@ietf.org>> <dhcwg@ietf.org<mailto:dhcwg@ietf.org>>; Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr<mailto:Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>>
>> Subject: RE: [dhcwg] Citing 'draft-ietf-dhc-secdhcpv6' (rfc3315bis)
>>
>>> so not very convincing to overturn a wg consensus on always enabling encryption
>>
>> Agreed. We held discussions with others (Randy Busy, etc.) and are under the belief that what is there is in the right direction. This is
>> an overall solution to the DHCP security solution and tries to address FULL security (as the traffic is encrypted - so it addresses privacy).
>>
>> I'm not sure if encryption harms anything in  your environment; so what harm is there to use it?
>>
>> Note that encryption will cause significant issues for DOCSIS and likely other deployments where the relay currently snoops the traffic.
>> So, we'll need to address how to handle that (either dust of the https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-agentopt-delegate
>> work or come up with something else). Until something else is in place, those environments just can't make use of this capability.
>>
>> - Bernie
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: jinmei.tatuya@gmail.com<mailto:jinmei.tatuya@gmail.com> [mailto:jinmei.tatuya@gmail.com<mailto:jinmei.tatuya@gmail.com>] On Behalf Of ????
>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 6:54 PM
>> To: Templin, Fred L <Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com<mailto:Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com>>
>> Cc: <dhcwg@ietf.org<mailto:dhcwg@ietf.org>> <dhcwg@ietf.org<mailto:dhcwg@ietf.org>>; Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr<mailto:Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>>; Bernie Volz (volz) <volz@cisco.com<mailto:volz@cisco.com>>
>> Subject: Re: [dhcwg] Citing 'draft-ietf-dhc-secdhcpv6' (rfc3315bis)
>>
>> At Thu, 18 Aug 2016 22:42:38 +0000,
>> "Templin, Fred L" <Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com<mailto:Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com>> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi, I already made a stronger case as follows:
>>>
>>>> I think what that means in terms of this draft is that for some use cases all
>>>> that is needed is for the client to include a Signature option in its DHCPv6
>>>> messages to the server. The client does not need to include a Certificate
>>>> option nor any encryption options. So, I would like it if the draft could
>>>> include a simple "authentication only" mode of operation.
>>
>> To me, it just looks like "in some cases encryption may not be needed"
>> and not so different from "it's overkilling for me", so not very
>> convincing to overturn a wg consensus on always enabling encryption.
>> But it's ultimately up to the wg.
>>
>> --
>> JINMEI, Tatuya

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