RE: [Geopriv] RE: Strawman Proposal

["Winterbottom, James" <[e-mail]>]

Let me put a very real case out there, and see if it can be overcome
just using location by reference and no signing.

I have two entities that are required to provide my access network. And
ISP and a region access network provider (RANP). The ISP cannot
determine location, yet any location reference will point to him, in LIS
terms it is a gateway LIS. The ISP must get location from the RANP. When
location is requested from the ISP by a reference, the ISP presents its
own certificate to the LR, yet it is not the ultimate source of the
location information. How does a certificate from the ISP link back to
location being provided by the RANP in this case?

I guess I don't see a certificate used to establish a TLS session with a
LIS as being the necessarily of the same stock as a certificate used to
sign a location. But maybe it is just me.



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:[e-mail]]
> Sent: Wednesday, 14 March 2007 8:54 AM
> To: Richard Barnes
> Cc: GEOPRIV; Dawson, Martin; Marc Linsner; Henning Schulzrinne
> Subject: Re: [Geopriv] RE: Strawman Proposal
> 
> We mentioned the idea of putting two PIDF-LOs into a SIP signaling
> message, namely one for routing and another one for consumption at the
> PSAP.
> The one for routing does not need to provide a perfect precision, as
we
> know. For some countries it would be sufficient to use state
granularity
> to hit the correct PSAP.
> 
> I am also addressing those people who argue that "Operators will never
> provide location information to the end host because they want to make
> money with location-based applications. Hence, they can only use
> location-by-reference".
> 
> I don't want to create relationships between every VoIP provider and
> every access network provider in the world because I believe that this
> will do a lot of harm to the Internet. I am OK with a relationship
> between access network provider and PSAPs even though I see a lot of
> problems there as well.
> 
> If we have to use a location-by-reference mechanism for these
operators
> then we don't need location signing.
> 
> I doubt that signed location information can be demanded for all
> emergency service calls since we will even see calls with absolutely
no
> location information at all. Furthermore, we would have to tell the
IEEE
> to go home since none of their solution does any sort of signing.
> 
> Ciao
> Hannes
> 
> 
> Richard Barnes wrote:
> >> Take a large campus with thousands of offices. Unless you have a
> >> fairly elaborate delegation mechanism, somebody externally will
have
> >> to sign for each and every room. This means that the organization
has
> >> to operate a CA that is trusted by the proposed VESA entity, for
> >> example. We can't even get delegation to work within Internet2 and
> >> Columbia.
> >
> > Location granularity and certification granularity are two
orthogonal
> > issues.  If there's one server that knows the geography of the whole
> > Columbia campus, then there's only one certificate to manage.  If
you
> > have one per building, then you have might a few more, or you might
> > have each server reach back to a central signing server for a
signature.
> >
> > --RB
> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>>
> >>> [AJW] It is not clear to me how authenticating millions of users
and
> >>> their multitude of identity mechanisms is any less daunting than
> >>>
> >>
> >> We have such a mechanism, e.g., within IMS, namely P-Asserted-ID,
> >> which is very widely deployed, from what I can tell. Or the SIP
> >> identity mechanism, although that seems to just start getting
> >> traction. The PSAP wouldn't care whether and how the VSP verified
the
> >> customer identity; it just gets a single client cert from the VSP
in
> >> a TLS connection.
> >>
> >> You probably missed the discussion on this years ago, but your
> >> concern and the perceived difficulties of a global PKI motivated
the
> >> current mechanism, as it only requires what customers must have
> >> already, namely a shared secret with their VSP, and web-style
> >> cross-provider trust with a single cert  for each provider.
> >>
> >>
> >>> providing accreditation to potentially thousands of access network
> >>> providers. But perhaps I am missing the point. That said, if you
> couple
> >>> this with signed location then you have the whole gamut. See
location
> >>> dependability draft
> >>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-geopriv-location-
> dependability-
> >>>
> >>> 00
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> PS: I also believe that the PSAP operator would accept calls that
> >>> don't
> >>>> have any location attached to it. How many calls today have
location
> >>>> information available? Do we have some statistics about it?
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> [AJW] All emergency calls in the world have some degree of
location
> >>> provided (inferred), though in some cases this may not be
> fantastically
> >>> accurate, country level. In the United States for wireline it is
based
> >>> on the calling line ID, and either an ESRD (roughly representing a
> >>> cell)
> >>> or an ESRK (representing a rough calling area) for wireless.
> >>>
> >>> Perhaps, like some other working groups we need to make the
> distinction
> >>> between support and implement. I am asking that the requirements
> >>> include
> >>> support for it, I think that implementation will be something that
> >>> jurisdictions have the option to do or not.
> >>
> >> This doesn't quite work, given that phones need to work
universally.
> >> I don't want to buy a phone in Prague, say, that suddenly can't
make
> >> an emergency call in New York city.
> >>
> >> Henning
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Geopriv mailing list
> >> [e-mail]
> >> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/geopriv
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Geopriv mailing list
> > [e-mail]
> > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/geopriv
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Geopriv mailing list
> [e-mail]
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/geopriv

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This message is for the designated recipient only and may
contain privileged, proprietary, or otherwise private information.  
If you have received it in error, please notify the sender
immediately and delete the original.  Any unauthorized use of
this email is prohibited.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[mf2]


_______________________________________________
Geopriv mailing list
[e-mail]
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/geopriv