RE: [Geopriv] RE: Strawman Proposal

["Dawson, Martin" <[e-mail]>]

Comments inline.

Cheers,
Martin

-----Original Message-----
From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:[e-mail]] 
Sent: Wednesday, 14 March 2007 8:54 AM
To: Richard Barnes
Cc: Henning Schulzrinne; GEOPRIV; Dawson, Martin; Marc Linsner
Subject: Re: [Geopriv] RE: Strawman Proposal

We mentioned the idea of putting two PIDF-LOs into a SIP signaling 
message, namely one for routing and another one for consumption at the
PSAP.
The one for routing does not need to provide a perfect precision, as we 
know. For some countries it would be sufficient to use state granularity

to hit the correct PSAP.

I am also addressing those people who argue that "Operators will never 
provide location information to the end host because they want to make 
money with location-based applications. Hence, they can only use 
location-by-reference".

I don't want to create relationships between every VoIP provider and 
every access network provider in the world because I believe that this 
will do a lot of harm to the Internet. I am OK with a relationship 
between access network provider and PSAPs even though I see a lot of 
problems there as well.

[[MCD]] 
[[MCD]] Absolutely agree. It seems that IMS actually makes that
assumption - using the traditional "roaming partner" model that assumes
the voice service *is* the access service. It misses the major point of
using the Internet. Imagine being told you could only use your email or
Internet banking from "partner" access providers.

If we have to use a location-by-reference mechanism for these operators 
then we don't need location signing.

[[MCD]] 
[[MCD]] No, I disagree. Signed location - even obtained via reference -
should still have the characteristics identified by the requirements.
Imagine a dereferencing done to an ISP LIS, but the location-determiner
and signer is actually a DSL infrastructure operator. About the only
characteristic that could probably be ignored is the temporal component.
That is, since I'm only asking right now, I know that the location is
being provided right now.

I doubt that signed location information can be demanded for all 
emergency service calls since we will even see calls with absolutely no 
location information at all. Furthermore, we would have to tell the IEEE

to go home since none of their solution does any sort of signing.
[[MCD]] 
[[MCD]] I doubt that it can to - especially in the short term. I see
this as providing the tools that can begin to be applied now but which
will really come into their own over the next ten years as the PSTN
begins to drag its other foot into the grave.

Ciao
Hannes


Richard Barnes wrote:
>> Take a large campus with thousands of offices. Unless you have a 
>> fairly elaborate delegation mechanism, somebody externally will have 
>> to sign for each and every room. This means that the organization has

>> to operate a CA that is trusted by the proposed VESA entity, for 
>> example. We can't even get delegation to work within Internet2 and 
>> Columbia.
>
> Location granularity and certification granularity are two orthogonal 
> issues.  If there's one server that knows the geography of the whole 
> Columbia campus, then there's only one certificate to manage.  If you 
> have one per building, then you have might a few more, or you might 
> have each server reach back to a central signing server for a
signature.
>
> --RB
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> [AJW] It is not clear to me how authenticating millions of users and
>>> their multitude of identity mechanisms is any less daunting than
>>>
>>
>> We have such a mechanism, e.g., within IMS, namely P-Asserted-ID, 
>> which is very widely deployed, from what I can tell. Or the SIP 
>> identity mechanism, although that seems to just start getting 
>> traction. The PSAP wouldn't care whether and how the VSP verified the

>> customer identity; it just gets a single client cert from the VSP in 
>> a TLS connection.
>>
>> You probably missed the discussion on this years ago, but your 
>> concern and the perceived difficulties of a global PKI motivated the 
>> current mechanism, as it only requires what customers must have 
>> already, namely a shared secret with their VSP, and web-style 
>> cross-provider trust with a single cert  for each provider.
>>
>>
>>> providing accreditation to potentially thousands of access network
>>> providers. But perhaps I am missing the point. That said, if you
couple
>>> this with signed location then you have the whole gamut. See
location
>>> dependability draft
>>>
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-geopriv-location-dependability-

>>>
>>> 00
>>>
>>>>
>>>> PS: I also believe that the PSAP operator would accept calls that
>>> don't
>>>> have any location attached to it. How many calls today have
location
>>>> information available? Do we have some statistics about it?
>>>>
>>>
>>> [AJW] All emergency calls in the world have some degree of location
>>> provided (inferred), though in some cases this may not be
fantastically
>>> accurate, country level. In the United States for wireline it is
based
>>> on the calling line ID, and either an ESRD (roughly representing a 
>>> cell)
>>> or an ESRK (representing a rough calling area) for wireless.
>>>
>>> Perhaps, like some other working groups we need to make the
distinction
>>> between support and implement. I am asking that the requirements 
>>> include
>>> support for it, I think that implementation will be something that
>>> jurisdictions have the option to do or not.
>>
>> This doesn't quite work, given that phones need to work universally. 
>> I don't want to buy a phone in Prague, say, that suddenly can't make 
>> an emergency call in New York city.
>>
>> Henning
>>
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>>
>>
>
>
>
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