Re: Proposed Statement on "HTTPS everywhere for the IETF"

Benson Schliesser <bensons@queuefull.net> Thu, 04 June 2015 19:06 UTC

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Date: Thu, 04 Jun 2015 12:07:17 -0700
From: Benson Schliesser <bensons@queuefull.net>
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Subject: Re: Proposed Statement on "HTTPS everywhere for the IETF"
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Ted Lemon wrote:
> So why are we still arguing about this?

For whatever it's worth, my personal view is that the proposed statement
is useful in an administrative context, in determining how we should
construct IETF services / tools. Whether it is also part of a broader
political statement is not particularly relevant.

It makes sense to me that we should employ the technology that we
produce, as we recommend it to be employed by the larger Internet
community, regardless of the specific privacy needs of the IETF. So, I
don't think there is anything to argue about here. Unless somebody knows
of material issues in the technology, such as ways that the
recommendation will break things, it seems safe for the IESG to rely on
prior consensus (i.e. about privacy etc) to make this statement.

Cheers,
-Benson