Re: Proposed Statement on "HTTPS everywhere for the IETF"

Hector Santos <hsantos@isdg.net> Sun, 07 June 2015 05:57 UTC

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Date: Sun, 07 Jun 2015 01:57:02 -0400
From: Hector Santos <hsantos@isdg.net>
Organization: Santronics Software, Inc.
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To: Xiaoyin Liu <xiaoyin.l@outlook.com>, "Niels Dettenbach Syndicat.com" <nd@syndicat.com>, Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>, IETF <ietf@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Proposed Statement on "HTTPS everywhere for the IETF"
References: <20150601164359.29999.35343.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com>, <CAL02cgRPFooA5fVFwvdprb3wPD+Y55pD+7RWjkACDv7T_TBW5Q@mail.gmail.com>, <1472054.O9DP0qoCQf@gongo> <556CBCF5.3060402@alvestrand.no>, <1C4D741C-89EA-4973-8536-D6A02EFD7624@syndicat.com>, <556D4C38.6060704@alvestrand.no>, <1F11D864-2532-4971-9771-F8037989A9BB@piuha.net>, <70AA892E-C97F-4EEA-9BB8-829F654FA57F@syndicat.com>, <557310E6.4010109@isdg.net> <BAY180-W22CC446142733EDDCB5407FFB00@phx.gbl>
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On 6/6/2015 11:08 PM, Xiaoyin Liu wrote:
>> Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2015 11:25:26 -0400
>> From: hsantos@isdg.net
>> To: nd@syndicat.com; jari.arkko@piuha.net; ietf@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: Proposed Statement on "HTTPS everywhere for the IETF"
>>
>> It could not update because the
>> HTTPS URL was failing due the browser seeing an erroneous "Invalid
>> Certificate" display with no option to accept, temporary or otherwise.
>>   You have to download via another browser that isn't so strict, yet.
>
> Why does the IETF use invalid certificates in the first place? If this
> is due to a wrong system clock, then the user probably cannot visit
> Google, Facebook, GitHub, etc. as well, and at least Firefox and
> Chrome advise users to fix the clock in such situation.
>
> Xiaoyin

Most likely because the HTTPS server is now fully PCI/DSS v3.1 
compliant which only supports TLS v1.1 or TLS v1.2.  I believe PCI/DSS 
v3.1 takes effects July 2015 so you are going to see a lot of this.

     PCI/DSS (Payment Card Industry/Data Security Standard) v3.0 to 
v3.1 changes
 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-1_Summary_of_Changes.pdf 


If the HTTPS server only enables TLS v1.1/v1.2 as required by PCI/DSS 
v3.1, this can fail older/current HTTPS clients which does not not 
support TLS v1.1/v1.2. It could/may display an erroneous "invalid 
certificate" display or even show an unknown site page because the 
non-compliant HTTPS socket request was broken.

For product update scenarios, if the site forces HTTPS transactions 
only, then its not possible for it to update itself via HTTPS.

This is more about implementations and how they need to learn how up 
"update" users using any current secured frontend. For PCI/DSS, I 
predict we will see many of these issues that in short will force 
users to update their client software on their machines, whether they 
like it or not.

-- 
HLS