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Re: 6MAN Adoption call on raft-chakrabarti-nordmark-6man-efficient-nd-04

Mikael Abrahamsson <swmike@swm.pp.se> Thu, 09 January 2014 06:09 UTC

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Date: Thu, 09 Jan 2014 07:09:13 +0100
From: Mikael Abrahamsson <swmike@swm.pp.se>
To: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Subject: Re: 6MAN Adoption call on raft-chakrabarti-nordmark-6man-efficient-nd-04
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On Thu, 9 Jan 2014, Lorenzo Colitti wrote:

> You don't need to modify ND to do that, though. You can defend against that
> sort of attack by having the ND implementation:
>
> 1. Prioritize preserving ND cache entries over making new address
> resolution attempts.
> 2. Glean ND cache entries from DAD packets (and if need be, NS/NA packets),
> and prioritize those gleaned entries over new address resolution attempts.
>
> Some of these measures are documented in RFC 6583.

If I do that, can I instantly drop packets not in my ND table already? (or 
my table of 1 and 2 above)?

If not, I don't consider it a complete solution.

-- 
Mikael Abrahamsson    email: swmike@swm.pp.se

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