Re: 6MAN Agenda for IETF86

Karl,

I definitely agree that ND needs to be secured.  Also agree that neither IPSec nor SEND are viable solutions.

I do not know if I am missing something but I have not seen a comprehensive document with these problems detailed.  I certainly don't have a solution but I have been trying to at least catalog such problems.   If there is such a document, would appreciate anyone letting me know.

If there isn't, if you would like, we can collaborate on such a document and create a draft for the IETF meeting in Berlin.   Maybe v6Ops is a place to discuss this topic.  Once many at IETF agree that indeed there is a problem, then we can discuss a potential solution.

Thanks,

Nalini Elkins
Inside Products, Inc.
(831) 659-8360
www.insidethestack.com

________________________________
 From: Karl Auer <kauer@biplane.com.au>
To: ipv6@ietf.org 
Sent: Tuesday, March 5, 2013 1:37 AM
Subject: Re: 6MAN Agenda for IETF86

On Mon, 2013-03-04 at 16:02 -0800, Bob Hinden wrote:
>    A Simple Secure Addressing Generation Scheme for IPv6
> AutoConfiguration
>     draft-rafiee-6man-ssas-01.txt
> [...]
>    DHCPv6/SLAAC Address Configuration Interaction Problem Statement
>     draft-liu-bonica-dhcpv6-slaac-problem-01.txt
> 
> We did not think there had been enough discussion or interest on the
> w.g. list to guarantee a speaking slot.  We allocated short slots at
> the end of the session if there is time before the meeting ends.  If
> anyone (other than the authors) think one of these should be given
> more time, please speak up.

For what it's worth it seems to me that there is a gaping hole around
securing ND. IPSec is obviously ridiculous, SEND is only marginally less
ridiculous. Maybe SSAS is a way forward? Or maybe noone else thinks ND
needs to be secured? Maybe the meeting could attempt to gauge whether
this is actually a real problem. I think it is, and I urge others to
speak up if they too think this should be pursued.

If there is a priority to these things, then sorting out the perceived
and actual discrepancies\ and ambiguities in the meaning of the RA M and
O flags would seem pretty important. Otherwise they will end up cemented
into even more implementations than they are now. The way Windows
handles them is just plain broken, and if the RFCs support that way of
handling them, then the RFCs are broken. At very least this topic needs
some impetus.

Regards, K.

-- 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Karl Auer (kauer@biplane.com.au)
http://www.biplane.com.au/kauer
http://www.biplane.com.au/blog

GPG fingerprint: B862 FB15 FE96 4961 BC62 1A40 6239 1208 9865 5F9A
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