RE: 6MAN Agenda for IETF86

"Hosnieh Rafiee" <ietf@rozanak.com> Tue, 05 March 2013 19:29 UTC

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From: Hosnieh Rafiee <ietf@rozanak.com>
To: 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
References: <7EE61AD6-2E54-4F17-BBFD-30BE77F7E782@gmail.com> <1362476231.3387.278.camel@karl> <3946.1362509293@sandelman.ca>
In-Reply-To: <3946.1362509293@sandelman.ca>
Subject: RE: 6MAN Agenda for IETF86
Date: Tue, 05 Mar 2013 20:28:45 +0100
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> SASS is similar, but uses a different algorithm, and you don't have to
recalculate each time you move.  For nodes that don't move, it seems
identical.

This is not true.  I think that you  have confused this draft with another
draft that was not about security but had the title "Stable Privacy
Addresses". Otherwise you are saying that you do not want to observe privacy
at all. The nodes' IP addresses are valid for a certain period of time which
is dependent on the network policy in vogue. In the draft, in several
sections, the need to change the IP address for privacy is  emphasized. 

It seems that I have to upload the latest version of my draft to a website
where others can read it. 

Thank you,
Hosnieh

-----Original Message-----
From: ipv6-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:ipv6-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Michael Richardson
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 7:48 PM
To: Karl Auer
Cc: ipv6@ietf.org
Subject: Re: 6MAN Agenda for IETF86


>>>>> "Karl" == Karl Auer <kauer@biplane.com.au> writes:
    Karl> On Mon, 2013-03-04 at 16:02 -0800, Bob Hinden wrote:
    >> A Simple Secure Addressing Generation Scheme for IPv6
    >> AutoConfiguration draft-rafiee-6man-ssas-01.txt [...]
    >> DHCPv6/SLAAC Address Configuration Interaction Problem Statement
    >> draft-liu-bonica-dhcpv6-slaac-problem-01.txt
    >> 
    >> We did not think there had been enough discussion or interest on
    >> the w.g. list to guarantee a speaking slot.  We allocated short
    >> slots at the end of the session if there is time before the
    >> meeting ends.  If anyone (other than the authors) think one of
    >> these should be given more time, please speak up.

    Karl> For what it's worth it seems to me that there is a gaping hole
    Karl> around securing ND. IPSec is obviously ridiculous, SEND is
    Karl> only marginally less ridiculous. Maybe SSAS is a way forward? 

SEND looked at AH and realized that it couldn't be used, so IPsec is a
non-starter.  I'd like to know what you know about SEND that the SEND WG
didn't...

SASS is similar, but uses a different algorithm, and you don't have to
recalculate each time you move.  For nodes that don't move, it seems
identical.

--
Michael Richardson
-on the road-