Re: [MIB-DOCTORS] Change the boilerplate

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

On 10/07/14 09:00, Bert Wijnen (IETF) wrote:
> I can see that for IoT related MIB modules there might be specific
> privacy concerns that
> you might want to describe in a special section. Not sure this should
> become a standard
> section in all MIB related documents though.

Yep, that's what I thought too. OTOH, its not clear that
boilerplate is really the right thing here - one common
way to handle privacy concerns is data minimisation which
here could map to not exposing an element or to only
exposing aggregate information rather than fine grained
values. Those are things that have to be thought about
by the MIB developers and can't just be handled via
current SNMP security since once the data is out there
the privacy breach has happened.

Cheers,
S.

PS: I'll add the above as a comment to the ballot later.

> 
> My 2 cents.
> 
> Bert
> 
> On 10/07/14 09:26, Benoit Claise wrote:
>>
>>> it is always interesting to see that when we get new ADs that we must
>>> rediscuss this whole topic.
>> Wait, there is more, two DISCUSSes from Kathleen regarding the
>> boilerplate (copied the Security ADs):
>> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-eman-battery-mib/ballot/#kathleen-moriarty
>>
>> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-eman-energy-aware-mib/ballot/#kathleen-moriarty
>>
>>
>> I would like to hear first from you guys before providing my opinion.
>>
>> Regards, Benoit
>>>
>>> But yes, there are/were implementations/deployments where one uses
>>> dedicated (secure) networks
>>> for the network management systems, and so that would work under a
>>> SHOULD.
>>>
>>> I do not recall if that was/is the only reason why we agreed on a
>>> SHOULD instead of MUST.
>>>
>>> Bert
>>>
>>> On 09/07/14 17:58, Benoit Claise wrote:
>>>> MIB doctors,
>>>>
>>>> Let me focus the discussion a little bit.
>>>> Alissa refers to this sentence in the boilerplate at
>>>> http://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/ops/trac/wiki/mib-security
>>>>
>>>>         Implementations SHOULD provide the security features
>>>> described by the
>>>>         SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410]), and implementations
>>>> claiming compliance
>>>>         to the SNMPv3 standard MUST include full support for
>>>> authentication and
>>>>         privacy via the User-based Security Model (USM) [RFC3414]
>>>> with the AES
>>>>         cipher algorithm [RFC3826].
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Alissa's feedback is:
>>>>
>>>>     It is a little disconcerting that use of SNMPv3 is provided as a
>>>> SHOULD-level requirement without discussion of deployment
>>>>     scenarios and regardless of the sensitivity of the data being
>>>> made available by any new MIB. For example, the tradeoffs between
>>>>     security and utility might be reasonable if (1) I’m using an
>>>> older SNMP version on my closed home network to monitor my own
>>>>     energy use, but not if (2) my ISP is using it to monitor the
>>>> same thing. The text quoted above basically  endorses unauthorized
>>>>     energy monitoring if the provider does not support SNMPv3,
>>>> whereas it seems like what we would want to be saying is that in
>>>>     cases like (2) SNMPv3 is required.
>>>>
>>>> Can one of the old timers (who was part of the discussion) explain
>>>> the SHOULD rational? Personally, I can see two use cases in favor
>>>> off the SHOULD: an older SNMP version in a closed network,  or a
>>>> private data communication network dedicated to network management
>>>> with special protection out of SNMP (like encrypted tunnel)
>>>>
>>>> Should we now modify this sentence to say?
>>>>
>>>>     MUST provide the security features described by the
>>>>     SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410])
>>>>
>>>> Regards, Benoit
>>>>
>>>>> MIB doctors,
>>>>>
>>>>> It seems that the "Security Guidelines for IETF MIB modules"
>>>>> receives comment for each MIB module submitted to the IESG.
>>>>> Is it time to modify it, or are we redoing the same discussions
>>>>> over and over?
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards, Benoit
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> -------- Original Message --------
>>>>> Subject:     Re: Alissa Cooper's Discuss on
>>>>> draft-ietf-eman-energy-monitoring-mib-12: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
>>>>> Date:     Tue, 8 Jul 2014 13:02:50 -0700
>>>>> From:     Alissa Cooper <[e-mail]>
>>>>> To:     Benoit Claise <[e-mail]>, The IESG <[e-mail]>
>>>>> CC: <[e-mail]>,
>>>>> <[e-mail]>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Benoit,
>>>>>
>>>>> On 7/8/14, 1:44 AM, "Benoit Claise" <[e-mail]
>>>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>     Hi Alissa,
>>>>>
>>>>>     Thanks for your review.
>>>>>>     Alissa Cooper has entered the following ballot position for
>>>>>>     draft-ietf-eman-energy-monitoring-mib-12: Discuss
>>>>>>
>>>>>>     When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply
>>>>>> to all
>>>>>>     email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to
>>>>>> cut this
>>>>>>     introductory paragraph, however.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>     Please refer
>>>>>> tohttp://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
>>>>>>     for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>     The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found
>>>>>> here:
>>>>>> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-eman-energy-monitoring-mib/
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>
>>>>>>     DISCUSS:
>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>     Section 11 is missing a discussion of the privacy
>>>>>> considerations of
>>>>>>     energy and power monitoring. I would suggest something along
>>>>>> the lines of
>>>>>>     the following:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>     "In certain situations, energy and power monitoring can reveal
>>>>>> sensitive
>>>>>>     information about individuals' activities and habits.
>>>>>> Implementors of
>>>>>>     this specification should use appropriate privacy protections as
>>>>>>     discussed in Section 9 of RFC 6988 and monitoring of
>>>>>> individuals and
>>>>>>     homes should only occur with proper authorization."
>>>>>
>>>>>     Regarding your first sentence, I propose the following text,
>>>>> which would be in line with Security Guidelines for IETF MIB
>>>>>     modules at
>>>>> http://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/ops/trac/wiki/mib-security
>>>>>
>>>>>         Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e.,
>>>>> objects with a
>>>>>         MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered
>>>>> sensitive or
>>>>>         vulnerable in some network environments.  It is thus
>>>>> important to
>>>>>         control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and
>>>>> possibly
>>>>>         to even encrypt the values of these objects when sending
>>>>> them over
>>>>>         the network via SNMP.  These are the tables and objects and
>>>>> their
>>>>>         sensitivity/vulnerability:
>>>>>
>>>>>         Access to the content of the eoPowerStateTable,
>>>>> eoEnergyTable, and
>>>>>         eoACPwrAttributesTable MIB tables can reveal sensitive
>>>>>         information about individuals' activities and habits
>>>>>
>>>>> Sounds good to me.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>     Since this document is essentially a MIB module, your last
>>>>> sentence is covered by
>>>>>
>>>>>              implementations
>>>>>              claiming compliance to the SNMPv3 standard MUST
>>>>> include full
>>>>>              support for authentication and privacy via the User-based
>>>>>              Security Model (USM) [RFC3414
>>>>> <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3414>] with the AES cipher algorithm
>>>>>              [RFC3826 <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3826>].
>>>>>
>>>>> RFC 6988 notes the need for privacy protections for stored data,
>>>>> which the above text does not speak to, so I still think a
>>>>> reference to RFC 6988 would add value here.
>>>>>
>>>>> It is a little disconcerting that use of SNMPv3 is provided as a
>>>>> SHOULD-level requirement without discussion of deployment
>>>>> scenarios and regardless of the sensitivity of the data being made
>>>>> available by any new MIB. For example, the tradeoffs between
>>>>> security and utility might be reasonable if (1) I’m using an older
>>>>> SNMP version on my closed home network to monitor my own energy
>>>>> use, but not if (2) my ISP is using it to monitor the same thing.
>>>>> The text quoted above basically  endorses unauthorized energy
>>>>> monitoring if the provider does not support SNMPv3, whereas it
>>>>> seems like what we would want to be saying is that in cases like
>>>>> (2) SNMPv3 is required.
>>>>>
>>>>> I understand that this is basically boilerplate language for MIB
>>>>> docs, so I’m not sure what can be done, but it seems unfortunate.
>>>>>
>>>>> Alissa
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>
>>>>>>     COMMENT:
>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>     Section 12.1:
>>>>>>     "New Assignments (and potential deprecation) to Power State Sets
>>>>>>              shall be administered by IANA and the guidelines and
>>>>>> procedures
>>>>>>              are specified in [EMAN-FMWK], and will, as a
>>>>>> consequence, the
>>>>>>              IANAPowerStateSet Textual Convention should be updated."
>>>>>>
>>>>>>     Not sure what this sentence means.
>>>>>     Good catch.
>>>>>     NEW:
>>>>>
>>>>>              "New Assignments (and potential deprecation) to Power
>>>>> State Sets
>>>>>              shall be administered by IANA and the guidelines and
>>>>> procedures
>>>>>              are specified in [EMAN-FMWK], and will, as a
>>>>> consequence, update the
>>>>>              IANAPowerStateSet Textual Convention."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>     Regards, Benoit (as a document author)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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>>
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