Re: [MIB-DOCTORS] Change the boilerplate - Kathleen'DISCUSS point 2

["ietfdbh" <[e-mail]>]

I think the new text is wordier, but doesn't really say more than the
original.
The devices being vulnerable to attack can have a negative effect on network
behavior.
I feat that readers of the wordier text would "tune out".

Rather than putting more details into the boilerplate, concerns should be
detailed in the security considerations, including an explanation of which
objects are sensitive, and how they increase vulnerability or impact network
behavior.

David Harrington
[e-mail]
[phone]
> -----Original Message-----
> From: MIB-DOCTORS [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of
> Benoit Claise
> Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 9:52 AM
> To: Thomas D. Nadeau; Bert Wijnen (IETF)
> Cc: MIB Doctors (E-mail); Alissa Cooper; [e-mail]; Farrel
Adrian
> Subject: Re: [MIB-DOCTORS] Change the boilerplate - Kathleen'DISCUSS
> point 2
> 
> Dear all,
> 
> Let's try to address one point at a time, and get closure one by one.
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-eman-energy-aware-
> mib/ballot/#kathleen-moriarty
> 
> Kathleen proposes:
> OLD:
> 
>     "The
>     support for SET operations in a non-secure environment without proper
>     protection can have a negative effect on network operations."
> 
> NEW:
> 
>     "The
>     support for SET operations in a non-secure environment without proper
>     protection can have a negative effect on network operations or leave
>     cyber physical devices used by individuals, homes, and business
>     vulnerable to attack."
> 
> 
> I believe this new proposal makes sense. Does anybody object?
> 
> Regards, Benoit
> 
> > On Jul 10, 2014:3:15 AM, at 3:15 AM, Bert Wijnen (IETF)
> <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >
> >> it is always interesting to see that when we get new ADs that we must
> rediscuss this whole topic.
> > 	This is precisely one of the things that is broken about the IETF
these
> days, if you ask me: the re-re-re-discussion of topics at the 11:59th hour
of a
> document's progress through the gauntlet.
> >
> >> But yes, there are/were implementations/deployments where one uses
> dedicated (secure) networks
> >> for the network management systems, and so that would work under a
> SHOULD.
> > 	I agree. Not all network operators use a secure management
> network, but many do.
> >
> >> I do not recall if that was/is the only reason why we agreed on a
SHOULD
> instead of MUST.
> > 	I don't think you can do a MUST here; not everyone uses v3 - in
fact, I
> think if you poll implementations you'll find VERY FEW using v3.
> >
> > 	--Tom
> >
> >
> >
> >> Bert
> >>
> >> On 09/07/14 17:58, Benoit Claise wrote:
> >>> MIB doctors,
> >>>
> >>> Let me focus the discussion a little bit.
> >>> Alissa refers to this sentence in the boilerplate at
> http://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/ops/trac/wiki/mib-security
> >>>
> >>>         Implementations SHOULD provide the security features described
> by the
> >>>         SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410]), and implementations claiming
> compliance
> >>>         to the SNMPv3 standard MUST include full support for
> authentication and
> >>>         privacy via the User-based Security Model (USM) [RFC3414] with
the
> AES
> >>>         cipher algorithm [RFC3826].
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Alissa's feedback is:
> >>>
> >>>     It is a little disconcerting that use of SNMPv3 is provided as a
SHOULD-
> level requirement without discussion of deployment
> >>>     scenarios and regardless of the sensitivity of the data being made
> available by any new MIB. For example, the tradeoffs between
> >>>     security and utility might be reasonable if (1) I'm using an older
SNMP
> version on my closed home network to monitor my own
> >>>     energy use, but not if (2) my ISP is using it to monitor the same
thing.
> The text quoted above basically  endorses unauthorized
> >>>     energy monitoring if the provider does not support SNMPv3, whereas
> it seems like what we would want to be saying is that in
> >>>     cases like (2) SNMPv3 is required.
> >>>
> >>> Can one of the old timers (who was part of the discussion) explain the
> SHOULD rational? Personally, I can see two use cases in favor
> >>> off the SHOULD: an older SNMP version in a closed network,  or a
private
> data communication network dedicated to network management
> >>> with special protection out of SNMP (like encrypted tunnel)
> >>>
> >>> Should we now modify this sentence to say?
> >>>
> >>>     MUST provide the security features described by the
> >>>     SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410])
> >>>
> >>> Regards, Benoit
> >>>
> >>>> MIB doctors,
> >>>>
> >>>> It seems that the "Security Guidelines for IETF MIB modules" receives
> comment for each MIB module submitted to the IESG.
> >>>> Is it time to modify it, or are we redoing the same discussions over
and
> over?
> >>>>
> >>>> Regards, Benoit
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> -------- Original Message --------
> >>>> Subject: 	Re: Alissa Cooper's Discuss on
draft-ietf-eman-energy-
> monitoring-mib-12: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
> >>>> Date: 	Tue, 8 Jul 2014 13:02:50 -0700
> >>>> From: 	Alissa Cooper <[e-mail]>
> >>>> To: 	Benoit Claise <[e-mail]>, The IESG <[e-mail]>
> >>>> CC: 	<[e-mail]>,
> <[e-mail]>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Hi Benoit,
> >>>>
> >>>> On 7/8/14, 1:44 AM, "Benoit Claise" <[e-mail]
> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>     Hi Alissa,
> >>>>
> >>>>     Thanks for your review.
> >>>>>     Alissa Cooper has entered the following ballot position for
> >>>>>     draft-ietf-eman-energy-monitoring-mib-12: Discuss
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply
to
> all
> >>>>>     email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to
cut this
> >>>>>     introductory paragraph, however.)
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     Please refer tohttp://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-
> criteria.html
> >>>>>     for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found
here:
> >>>>>     http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-eman-energy-
> monitoring-mib/
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>>     DISCUSS:
> >>>>>
----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     Section 11 is missing a discussion of the privacy considerations
of
> >>>>>     energy and power monitoring. I would suggest something along the
> lines of
> >>>>>     the following:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     "In certain situations, energy and power monitoring can reveal
> sensitive
> >>>>>     information about individuals' activities and habits.
Implementors of
> >>>>>     this specification should use appropriate privacy protections as
> >>>>>     discussed in Section 9 of RFC 6988 and monitoring of individuals
and
> >>>>>     homes should only occur with proper authorization."
> >>>>     Regarding your first sentence, I propose the following text,
which
> would be in line with Security Guidelines for IETF MIB
> >>>>     modules at
http://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/ops/trac/wiki/mib-security
> >>>>
> >>>>         Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e.,
objects with
> a
> >>>>         MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered
> sensitive or
> >>>>         vulnerable in some network environments.  It is thus
important to
> >>>>         control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and
> possibly
> >>>>         to even encrypt the values of these objects when sending them
> over
> >>>>         the network via SNMP.  These are the tables and objects and
their
> >>>>         sensitivity/vulnerability:
> >>>>
> >>>>         Access to the content of the eoPowerStateTable,
eoEnergyTable,
> and
> >>>>         eoACPwrAttributesTable MIB tables can reveal sensitive
> >>>>         information about individuals' activities and habits
> >>>>
> >>>> Sounds good to me.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>     Since this document is essentially a MIB module, your last
sentence is
> covered by
> >>>>
> >>>>              implementations
> >>>>              claiming compliance to the SNMPv3 standard MUST include
full
> >>>>              support for authentication and privacy via the
User-based
> >>>>              Security Model (USM) [RFC3414
> <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3414>] with the AES cipher algorithm
> >>>>              [RFC3826  <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3826>].
> >>>>
> >>>> RFC 6988 notes the need for privacy protections for stored data,
which
> the above text does not speak to, so I still think a
> >>>> reference to RFC 6988 would add value here.
> >>>>
> >>>> It is a little disconcerting that use of SNMPv3 is provided as a
SHOULD-
> level requirement without discussion of deployment
> >>>> scenarios and regardless of the sensitivity of the data being made
> available by any new MIB. For example, the tradeoffs between
> >>>> security and utility might be reasonable if (1) I'm using an older
SNMP
> version on my closed home network to monitor my own energy
> >>>> use, but not if (2) my ISP is using it to monitor the same thing. The
text
> quoted above basically  endorses unauthorized energy
> >>>> monitoring if the provider does not support SNMPv3, whereas it seems
> like what we would want to be saying is that in cases like
> >>>> (2) SNMPv3 is required.
> >>>>
> >>>> I understand that this is basically boilerplate language for MIB
docs, so
> I'm not sure what can be done, but it seems unfortunate.
> >>>>
> >>>> Alissa
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>>
----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>>     COMMENT:
> >>>>>
----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     Section 12.1:
> >>>>>     "New Assignments (and potential deprecation) to Power State Sets
> >>>>>              shall be administered by IANA and the guidelines and
> procedures
> >>>>>              are specified in [EMAN-FMWK], and will, as a
consequence, the
> >>>>>              IANAPowerStateSet Textual Convention should be
updated."
> >>>>>
> >>>>>     Not sure what this sentence means.
> >>>>     Good catch.
> >>>>     NEW:
> >>>>
> >>>>              "New Assignments (and potential deprecation) to Power
State
> Sets
> >>>>              shall be administered by IANA and the guidelines and
> procedures
> >>>>              are specified in [EMAN-FMWK], and will, as a
consequence,
> update the
> >>>>              IANAPowerStateSet Textual Convention."
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>     Regards, Benoit (as a document author)
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> MIB-DOCTORS mailing list
> >>>> [e-mail]
> >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mib-doctors
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> MIB-DOCTORS mailing list
> >>> [e-mail]
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> >>>
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> >>
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