Re: [Ntp] SNTP and extension fields (WAS: Re: Antw: Re: Antw: Re: Antw: [EXT] NTPv5 Loop Detection without Stratum)

Danny Mayer <mayer@pdmconsulting.net> Tue, 06 September 2022 15:37 UTC

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Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2022 11:37:39 -0400
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To: kristof.teichel=40ptb.de@dmarc.ietf.org, Hal Murray <halmurray@sonic.net>
Cc: "ntp@ietf.org" <ntp@ietf.org>, ntp <ntp-bounces@ietf.org>, Ulrich Windl <Ulrich.Windl@rz.uni-regensburg.de>
References: <Ulrich.Windl@rz.uni-regensburg.de> <6316E754020000A10004D6D4@gwsmtp.uni-regensburg.de> <20220906070439.08DEE28C1D8@107-137-68-211.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net> <OF28F46941.3B68CC6E-ONC12588B5.00356D41-C12588B5.0036092A@ptb.de>
From: Danny Mayer <mayer@pdmconsulting.net>
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Subject: Re: [Ntp] SNTP and extension fields (WAS: Re: Antw: Re: Antw: Re: Antw: [EXT] NTPv5 Loop Detection without Stratum)
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On 9/6/22 5:50 AM, kristof.teichel=40ptb.de@dmarc.ietf.org wrote:
> > 
> > Ulrich.Windl@rz.uni-regensburg.de said:
> > > Yes, but a "packet format" does not mean a fixed-length packet 
> IMHO; instead
> > > if should contain a mechanism for a variable number of optional 
> fields that
> > > can have a variable length and should be parseable even if it's 
> only to
> > > ignore them. I think that is what the e tension fields had in 
> mind, but
> > > somewhat short-sighted.
> >
> > You are tangling 2 threads.  The chunk you are replying to is 
> discussing SNTP.
> >
> > The S is for Simple.  I hope SNTP will work without extension fields.
> >
>
> Wouldn't that preclude use of NTS?
> (It would, and also that of any other security measures other than 
> v3-era symmetric key MAC with unspecified key exchange, if I'm not 
> mistaken...)
>
> If that's correct: can we afford to rule out modern (well-scaling) 
> authentication for any and all SNTP clients?
>
Yes, we want authenticated packets even in an SNTP implementation. 
Saying we don't care about authentication won't get through IETF today.

Danny