Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptographic hygiene and the limits of jwks_uri
Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> Thu, 30 January 2020 19:27 UTC
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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2020 11:27:10 -0800
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To: "Richard Backman, Annabelle" <richanna=40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: "Manger, James" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptographic hygiene and the limits of jwks_uri
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Rephrasing Annabelle's description to highlight the issue: The AS says "here are the keys to use to verify all of the tokens that *we* have signed" Separating duties in a large system is good cryptographic hygiene, IE, one component signs ID Tokens, another signs access tokens. On Wed, Jan 29, 2020 at 1:36 PM Richard Backman, Annabelle <richanna= 40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > This could be nice, but it’s solving a different problem. The issue I’m > drawing attention to is about how an AS indicates that a given key is > valid. That’s what the jwks_uri AS metadata property is for, and it does a > great job. The problem is that it does not allow enough granularity. > Currently all an AS can do is say “here are the keys to use to verify stuff > I signed.” It can’t say “here are the keys to use to verify ID Tokens, and > here is a different set of keys to use to verify access tokens.” > > — > Annabelle Backman > AWS Identity > > > On Jan 28, 2020, at 10:51 PM, Manger, James < > James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com> wrote: > > > > > >> > >>> It would’ve been nice if JWK could’ve agreed on a URL-based > >>> addressing format for individual keys within the set, but that ship’s > sailed. > > > > Using the fragment on a JWKS URL to indicate the key id would be good. > > Then a single URL by itself can identify a specific key. > > > > https://example.com/keys.jwks#2011-04-29 > > > > This would have worked particularly well if a JWKS was a JSON object > with key-ids as the member names, instead of an array. That is presumably > too late to fix. But defining the fragment format for > application/jwk-set+json to be a kid value should be possible. > > > > If you put multiple keys with the same key-id in a JWKS you are asking > for trouble -- just call that a non-interoperable corner for people to > avoid. > > > > -- > > James Manger > > _______________________________________________ > > OAuth mailing list > > OAuth@ietf.org > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >
- [OAUTH-WG] Cryptographic hygiene and the limits o… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cryptographic hygiene and the limi… Mike Jones
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Aaron Parecki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: [UNVERIFIE… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: [UNVERIFIE… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Aaron Parecki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Manger, James
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… John Bradley