Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptographic hygiene and the limits of jwks_uri
Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com> Fri, 10 January 2020 18:19 UTC
Return-Path: <aaron@parecki.com>
X-Original-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 65B45120804 for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 10 Jan 2020 10:19:16 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.897
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.897 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_FONT_LOW_CONTRAST=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=parecki-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id tOhUhd91qUm0 for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 10 Jan 2020 10:19:14 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-io1-xd36.google.com (mail-io1-xd36.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::d36]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5F726120B4B for <oauth@ietf.org>; Fri, 10 Jan 2020 10:19:14 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-io1-xd36.google.com with SMTP id n21so3046194ioo.10 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Fri, 10 Jan 2020 10:19:14 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=parecki-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=9xs576f6d5dqZOxhha+9CBonfOK7hA9mBl3+BUxm+XU=; b=y0GtvGsGBuyfcaxiQSF7GcBaEDy2pu3eulnTsqWnPiX71MWF9c0x6SiPOzJua9Gen5 a9+ltUDTWlelyC+GnHThOwgJx6HGeZp9rKqVeDg6fpScTmgF3p2eH0B5so8dCGbMsJyC ziPQ/LX7Cgj/cu9IZ9+qxCtykkXFq2pM8iE49J/lsfbQcnPd9j077mLA5DltmLkLVQlV ZWvjoBhbE1Z44crulJq/G0KOuds4K0ET12mE14UVxCrJHwIeWpy24xJfi7LunNq1+STG ceAprsKf578Sk4dHsBqj7lJaaG5/bjYdmQBebUqyXtpEwLmZXCSzTy28K17VubDJiv/Z I+9Q==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=9xs576f6d5dqZOxhha+9CBonfOK7hA9mBl3+BUxm+XU=; b=L/yXamT5SzSYpJ9xfWdptsDRvAR/CMiSfon0GSudiM69h8PoU2HF17lrHeLaXTgYP5 xWBSfyu7lZ8DUuv5PTEN732wXXIK2jreVPX4WdtlTEX28aUClPUTP0I+GR0ENxT2jb7j QAWCJEJaqYTQJ3QKuEhkxRhTQa3mztfoKC234pL1u05bDwv50WSZc2Y66urDtlf60Q25 arNd/JH2Dp062yDGKorwm0zRtUUCdXJZ7b7Ws23UlGG5JLXGknl4turfewwldlje7GJK THXbtn27MrhdlGF6rVFNIu0BHRYzlb7BVUlfTuhyRHq9kbyVa1ZhJGZ8vs0T/CUM9sy6 4QnQ==
X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAXPMYLtBBGkFfCFVthjX4BlsRS00XbLu3b+a8sRXdSsjFMIxSa3 FQEqHo53Q+Hn1mLfSzHMDEYfr/DL8uE=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqy0nw3CFxoVNW6fklzZMQogcGcG3X49K5FaoGo8Z/hJ93S0Y0zDRIUUNGwEVDGb0wqLP/Hq5w==
X-Received: by 2002:a5d:8cc4:: with SMTP id k4mr3592825iot.2.1578680353446; Fri, 10 Jan 2020 10:19:13 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-il1-f176.google.com (mail-il1-f176.google.com. [209.85.166.176]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id z24sm897488ilf.31.2020.01.10.10.19.12 for <oauth@ietf.org> (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 10 Jan 2020 10:19:12 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-il1-f176.google.com with SMTP id z12so2467575iln.11 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Fri, 10 Jan 2020 10:19:12 -0800 (PST)
X-Received: by 2002:a92:bbc1:: with SMTP id x62mr3539739ilk.156.1578680352691; Fri, 10 Jan 2020 10:19:12 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <CAD9ie-sHSNn34S-hyQHa-uxMKNhH22i-9ajdyTEyPh8w61yHsA@mail.gmail.com> <9D366169-C548-4D5C-8F4B-E546829DC9B0@lodderstedt.net> <CAD9ie-vChM=AamCTmZpM5SuhZmeahV+Ym8Vfnr5GoN=xQn614g@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAD9ie-vChM=AamCTmZpM5SuhZmeahV+Ym8Vfnr5GoN=xQn614g@mail.gmail.com>
From: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 12:19:01 -0600
X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: <CAGBSGjpFMKTCNYgeh4p7Nyh6urTbmQ0qYFHPUa+OX51Hj88UVg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAGBSGjpFMKTCNYgeh4p7Nyh6urTbmQ0qYFHPUa+OX51Hj88UVg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Cc: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "Richard Backman, Annabelle" <richanna=40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000a2dc83059bcd29d8"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/fpcOJ1yC0QtQqv396-5ai_FVieE>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptographic hygiene and the limits of jwks_uri
X-BeenThere: oauth@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: OAUTH WG <oauth.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/>
List-Post: <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 18:19:16 -0000
Can the keys in the document at the jwks_uri indicate what they are for? Either by adding other top-level properties next to "keys" or by specifying a property on a key itself? At least that way implementations that expect just one value of jwks_uri wouldn't have to change. Aaron On Fri, Jan 10, 2020 at 12:16 PM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote: > Yes. Thanks for clarifying. > ᐧ > > On Fri, Jan 10, 2020 at 10:14 AM Torsten Lodderstedt < > torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote: > >> You mean additional JWKS URIs, for example? >> >> Am 10.01.2020 um 19:09 schrieb Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail..com >> <dick.hardt@gmail.com>>: >> >> >> Perhaps I am misunderstanding what Annabelle was getting at, but having >> more than one key in the metadata document would solve the the issue. IE, >> extensions would define their own key instead of using the same one. >> >> The metadata document itself was an extension. >> >> >> On Fri, Jan 10, 2020 at 9:58 AM Torsten Lodderstedt < >> torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> > Am 10.01.2020 um 18:23 schrieb Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>: >>> > >>> > As OAuth 2.0 has been extended, the AS is now also an OpenID Connect >>> Provider, and the access token is being defined. These extensions have >>> assumed all of this functionality is a monolith. >>> > >>> > I'm not suggesting that we MUST make changes to existing extensions, >>> but design future extensions so that an implementation can separate duties >>> if desired. >>> >>> How do you envision this to work? As you said, OAuth 2.0 is built on the >>> assumption the AS is (at least logically) a monolith. All extension were >>> built on that underlying assumption. I don’t see how an arbitrary extension >>> can relax that assumption and still be compatible with the rest (just >>> revisit the discussion re PAR and keys). >>> >>> I think we should accept this design assumption, in the same way we >>> should accept form encoding as request format instead of JSON, for OAuth >>> 2.0 extensions. >>> >>> OAuth 3.0 could explicitely be developed with different architectures in >>> mind. >> >> _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > -- ---- Aaron Parecki aaronparecki.com @aaronpk <http://twitter.com/aaronpk>
- [OAUTH-WG] Cryptographic hygiene and the limits o… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Cryptographic hygiene and the limi… Mike Jones
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Aaron Parecki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: [UNVERIFIE… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] Re: [UNVERIFIE… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Aaron Parecki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Manger, James
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptograp… John Bradley