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Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptographic hygiene and the limits of jwks_uri

Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> Fri, 10 January 2020 18:15 UTC

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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 10:15:26 -0800
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To: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
Cc: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, "Richard Backman, Annabelle" <richanna=40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptographic hygiene and the limits of jwks_uri
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Yes. Thanks for clarifying.
ᐧ

On Fri, Jan 10, 2020 at 10:14 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <
torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:

> You mean additional JWKS URIs, for example?
>
> Am 10.01.2020 um 19:09 schrieb Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>:
>
> 
> Perhaps I am misunderstanding what Annabelle was getting at, but having
> more than one key in the metadata document would solve the the issue. IE,
> extensions would define their own key instead of using the same one.
>
> The metadata document itself was an extension.
>
>
> On Fri, Jan 10, 2020 at 9:58 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <
> torsten@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> > Am 10.01.2020 um 18:23 schrieb Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>:
>> >
>> > As OAuth 2.0 has been extended, the AS is now also an OpenID Connect
>> Provider, and the access token is being defined. These extensions have
>> assumed all of this functionality is a monolith.
>> >
>> > I'm not suggesting that we MUST make changes to existing extensions,
>> but design future extensions so that an implementation can separate duties
>> if desired.
>>
>> How do you envision this to work? As you said, OAuth 2.0 is built on the
>> assumption the AS is (at least logically) a monolith. All extension were
>> built on that underlying assumption. I don’t see how an arbitrary extension
>> can relax that assumption and still be compatible with the rest (just
>> revisit the discussion re PAR and keys).
>>
>> I think we should accept this design assumption, in the same way we
>> should accept form encoding as request format instead of JSON, for OAuth
>> 2.0 extensions.
>>
>> OAuth 3.0 could explicitely be developed with different architectures in
>> mind.
>
>

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