Re: [OAUTH-WG] why are we signing?

John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com> Wed, 02 December 2009 17:49 UTC

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From: John Panzer <jpanzer@google.com>
Date: Wed, 02 Dec 2009 09:49:21 -0800
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To: Prateek Mishra <prateek.mishra@oracle.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] why are we signing?
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It requires a security considerations section :).
--
John Panzer / Google
jpanzer@google.com / abstractioneer.org / @jpanzer



On Wed, Dec 2, 2009 at 7:18 AM, Prateek Mishra <prateek.mishra@oracle.com>wrote:

> Stephen,
>
> +1 from our side.
>
> Here is a newbie question: does the IETF process require a discussion of
> threats and countermeasures
> as part of the specification? - explaining the specific situations that
> rely on SSL or signing and what the consequences
> of "turning it off" might be...
>
> - prateek
>
>  I think we'll need an analysis of where we end up wanting TLS
>> for the protocols we produce. I wouldn't expect any big
>> surprises, but right now I don't think we can be sure since
>> things seems to be in flux to some extent.
>>
>> Then, I'd be for saying that TLS MUST be used for those operations.
>> However, I can well believe that there may be some niches where
>> using TLS isn't easy, so I could live with something like: it MUST
>> be possible to use TLS, and that deployments SHOULD use it, with
>> guidance as to the type of scenario where we think TLS really
>> has to be turned on, and maybe text about why sometimes people
>> can't do that.
>>
>> So I don't think we can finish this discussion at this stage.
>>
>> S.
>>
>> Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote:
>>
>>
>>> <smiling but not joking>
>>>
>>> I would like to make an official request to the chair for a consensus
>>> call on recommending SSL but keeping it optional in the various OAuth
>>> components. We can figure out how strong to make the language (or how
>>> scary), and we may make it mandatory in some flows/profiles, but I would
>>> like to be done with this discussion (for the n time).
>>>
>>> If someone will want to raise new arguments, well, this is the IETF so
>>> who can stop them? :-)
>>>
>>> EHL
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: Dick Hardt [mailto:Dick.Hardt@microsoft.com]
>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 01, 2009 9:51 PM
>>>> To: Brian Eaton
>>>> Cc: Eran Hammer-Lahav; Peter Saint-Andre; <ext@core3.amsl.com>;
>>>> Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo); oauth@ietf.org
>>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] why are we signing?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 2009-12-01, at 5:46 PM, Brian Eaton wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 7:08 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> <eran@hueniverse.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Getting a Class 1 cert from the likes of StartSSL is easy as pie
>>>>>>> these days. IMHO there is no excuse for not deploying SSL if you
>>>>>>> care one whit about security. The problem is that too many
>>>>>>> small-scale developers (and big companies!) simply don't care.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Don't care, don't need that much security, don't understand it, etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> Bottom line is that requiring SSL is certain to fork this work if not
>>>> done right.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Note, however, that someone who can't get SSL working and still
>>>>> deploys OAuth has basically no security against eavesdroppers or MITM
>>>>> attacks, and certainly can't expect OAuth to provide it.  The issues
>>>>> are in the token issuance phase: these organizations are sending user
>>>>> passwords and session cookies in clear text!  OAuth is the least of
>>>>> their security concerns,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> If the cost of SSL outweighs the risk of a security breach, then why
>>>> would a
>>>> developer deploying OAuth choose to sign their messages rather then use
>>>> the simpler bearer token?
>>>>
>>>> Peter Saint-Andre questioned why SSL was required in OAuth WRAP. I think
>>>> that is a good question. Perhaps it should be RECOMMENDED, and
>>>> deployments can make their own benefit analysis.
>>>>
>>>> -- Dick
>>>>
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
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>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
>>
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