Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth WRAP

"RL 'Bob' Morgan" <rlmorgan@washington.edu> Thu, 12 November 2009 02:25 UTC

Return-Path: <rlmorgan@washington.edu>
X-Original-To: oauth@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: oauth@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4DAFF28C1AA for <oauth@core3.amsl.com>; Wed, 11 Nov 2009 18:25:11 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.599
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BP4W4BIjz842 for <oauth@core3.amsl.com>; Wed, 11 Nov 2009 18:25:10 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mxout3.cac.washington.edu (mxout3.cac.washington.edu [140.142.32.166]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B65E28C13A for <oauth@ietf.org>; Wed, 11 Nov 2009 18:25:10 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtp.washington.edu (smtp.washington.edu [140.142.33.9] (may be forged)) by mxout3.cac.washington.edu (8.14.3+UW09.06/8.14.3+UW09.09) with ESMTP id nAC2Pcmq008534 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK) for <oauth@ietf.org>; Wed, 11 Nov 2009 18:25:38 -0800
X-Auth-Received: from host-24-167.meeting.ietf.org (host-24-167.meeting.ietf.org [133.93.24.167]) (authenticated authid=rlmorgan) by smtp.washington.edu (8.14.3+UW09.06/8.14.3+UW09.05) with ESMTP id nAC2PZBX001750 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NOT) for <oauth@ietf.org>; Wed, 11 Nov 2009 18:25:38 -0800
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2009 11:25:34 +0900
From: RL 'Bob' Morgan <rlmorgan@washington.edu>
X-X-Sender: rlmorgan@perf.cac.washington.edu
To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: <4AFB2940.2030709@stpeter.im>
Message-ID: <alpine.LFD.2.00.0911121041520.23575@perf.cac.washington.edu>
References: <daf5b9570911082102u215dcf22gf0aeb2f3578e5ea0@mail.gmail.com> <35D50F5C-3982-4298-A9E0-86A528F5C5D3@jkemp.net> <daf5b9570911092158k682aff63l959c423c399b2277@mail.gmail.com> <B1B9E4FC-0AF5-4357-B06F-F533C84F3C7D@microsoft.com> <cb5f7a380911101438v2dab3dbas7ab4d40961544833@mail.gmail.com> <4AFB2940.2030709@stpeter.im>
User-Agent: Alpine 2.00 (LFD 1167 2008-08-23)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; format="flowed"; charset="US-ASCII"
X-PMX-Version: 5.5.8.383112, Antispam-Engine: 2.7.2.376379, Antispam-Data: 2009.11.12.21535
X-Uwash-Spam: Gauge=X, Probability=10%, Report=' TO_IN_SUBJECT 0.5, BODY_SIZE_1900_1999 0, BODY_SIZE_2000_LESS 0, BODY_SIZE_5000_LESS 0, BODY_SIZE_7000_LESS 0, FROM_EDU_TLD 0, __BOUNCE_CHALLENGE_SUBJ 0, __BOUNCE_NDR_SUBJ_EXEMPT 0, __CT 0, __CT_TEXT_PLAIN 0, __HAS_MSGID 0, __MIME_TEXT_ONLY 0, __MIME_VERSION 0, __SANE_MSGID 0, __TO_MALFORMED_2 0, __USER_AGENT 0'
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth WRAP
X-BeenThere: oauth@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: OAUTH WG <oauth.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth>
List-Post: <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2009 02:25:11 -0000

Finally looking at OAuth-WRAP draft, it occurs to me that there is some 
context to the architecture presented there that might help.  Let me say 
that I haven't been involved in the development of WRAP, so might be 
getting this wrong from the point of view of WRAP folks, I apologize if 
so.

The concept of a "security token service" (STS) has been developed and 
promoted as an architecture (or pattern, perhaps) in the community that 
might be variously labelled as WS-Security or WS-* or SOAP-based Web 
Services.  Searching for the phrase will reveal lots of explanatory 
material.  At least in enterprise circles the STS concept has become 
pretty well accepted, even if not so widely deployed.  As a concrete 
WS-based service the STS is accessed via the WS-Trust protocol.  WS-Trust 
conveys security tokens but is intended to be token-neutral, that is, it 
can be profiled to carry many/most/all tokens associated with existing 
security protocols.  A WS-Trust-based STS then (in theory) can translate 
between what a client has and what a resource server needs.  This pattern 
is appealing in large organizations to centralize token issuance in the 
face of many apps with heterogenous security protocol needs.

It is my impression that the discussions that led to WRAP were around the 
observation by some large organizations that they find the STS pattern 
attractive to manage access with partners of all kinds; but that the WS-* 
stack is hard to deploy; and OAuth does something much similar and is much 
easier to deploy.  So they'd like a "RESTized STS" or a "OAuth with an STS 
in it".  That's more or less what I see in this proposal, though I haven't 
read it in detail.

So, eg, statements about "opaque tokens" in WRAP as far as I can tell 
aren't meant to distinguish it from OAuth 1.0 but to reflect the design 
inputs from WS-Trust and STS.

  - RL "Bob"