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Re: [openpgp] [RFC4880bis PATCH] Deprecate "Revocation Key", replacing with full-key "Designated Revoker"

vedaal@nym.hush.com Mon, 05 August 2019 18:23 UTC

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Date: Mon, 05 Aug 2019 14:23:26 -0400
To: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Cc: IETF OpenPGP WG <openpgp@ietf.org>
From: vedaal@nym.hush.com
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] [RFC4880bis PATCH] Deprecate "Revocation Key", replacing with full-key "Designated Revoker"
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On 8/5/2019 at 1:45 PM, "Werner Koch" <wk@gnupg.org> wrote:

>I view this as problematic in the light of our preparations to 
>allow for
>larger key material.  With PQC we may need megabyte large keys and 
>then
>including an entire key would double the size of a keyblock.

=====

There is a workaround which could avoid this;

Generating a Revocation Certificate for the key, and keeping it in a separate place from the keyring,
and also sending it to whomever the user wants to be the 'designated revoker', 
(which could change from time to time, without having to update the keyblock itself).

If this seems reasonable, then maybe consider it as a 'suggestion/comment'  to the rfc section dealing with revocation.


vedaal

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