Re: [openpgp] Fingerprints

ianG <iang@iang.org> Thu, 07 May 2015 12:14 UTC

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Date: Thu, 07 May 2015 13:14:52 +0100
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Fingerprints
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On 6/05/2015 23:14 pm, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> On Wed, May 6, 2015 at 5:31 PM, Christoph Anton Mitterer
> <calestyo@scientia.net> wrote:

>> Is there any broad consensus already about SHA2 vs. SHA3 (except the
>> traditionalist argument)?
>
> The folk I have spoken to were of the opinion that the SHA3 contest
> actually confirmed people's confidence in SHA2. So I don't see a need
> to jump to the next bright shiny object.
>
> SHA3 is supported in pretty much every stack now, SHA3 is still a bit
> of a work in progress.
>
> So I would suggest that SHA-2-512 be REQUIRED and SHA-3-512 be RECOMMENDED.



All the above is reasonable.  However there is one further argument in 
favour of SHA-3 which is that it is going to come in the form of a much 
larger / more powerful toolkit.  It's no longer "just a hash."

It has specific modes attached to it that can do, for example, AE, and 
that AE mode has (I gather) been used for the CAESAR competition.

Point being, there is a chance that we can do the whole symmetric part 
with only one algorithm... :-o

Now I know this will give people the heebie jeebies, so what I'd say now 
is that we delay a firm decision until NIST have published their spec on 
SHA-3 and then review it to get the true story.  My information is based 
on a presentation I saw by the Keccak team, so possibly I'm way off 
base.  NIST will clarify this all.


iang