Re: [openpgp] Designated Revokers

Vincent Breitmoser <look@my.amazin.horse> Mon, 20 April 2015 16:18 UTC

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From: Vincent Breitmoser <look@my.amazin.horse>
To: IETF OpenPGP <openpgp@ietf.org>
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Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:54:11 +0200
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Designated Revokers
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On 20 Apr 2015, Derek Atkins wrote:
> Specified Revokers use the (binary) full fingerprint, not the
> (truncated) keyID.

I would motion for designated revokers to use (or include) the full
public key. This allows verification of a revocation signature in
combination with a designated revoker certificate *without* the
requirement to retrieve, parse, and verify an entire other key, allows
supporting designated revokers without requiring the possibility to
retrieve keys during import. There are two downsides to consider:

- increased packet size. not by an order of magnitude though, and if
  this is a concern the designated revoker certificate can be published
  together with the revocation only

- incomplete verification of the designated revoker's key. if we fetch a
  key by fingerprint, it might have been revoked before the revocation
  was issued, invalidating the revocation signature. this still leaves
  the key in question in a very fishy state and it probably makes more
  sense than not to consider it revoked.

Another alternative would be adding the public key to the revocation
certificate as a subpacket.  Both options have the same downsides, and
none of them stands out as the natural choice to me.

 - V