Re: [perpass] Violating end-to-end principle: I-D Action: draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-00.txt

Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Thu, 16 January 2014 19:23 UTC

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Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 14:23:20 -0500
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Cc: Adrian Farrel <adrian@olddog.co.uk>, perpass <perpass@ietf.org>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Subject: Re: [perpass] Violating end-to-end principle: I-D Action: draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-00.txt
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On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 09:57:07AM -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> End to end ideology in security is particularly harmful because there are
> some security controls that are simply not compatible with end-to-end
> approaches. You cannot protect against traffic or meta-data analysis
> end-to-end.

That may be true, but the alternative of edge-to-edge security is even
worse.  Edge-to-edge security also doesn't protect against traffic or
meta-data analysis, and upon receipt of a National Security Letter to
your IMAP provider, doesn't protect the contents of your e-mail,
either.

So I don't see how claiming that striving for end-to-end security is
"harmful".

Best,

		    	     	     	     - Ted