Re: [perpass] Violating end-to-end principle: I-D Action: draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-00.txt

[Stephen Kent <[e-mail]>]

Stephen,
> Hi Ted,
>
> On 01/16/2014 07:23 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
>> That may be true, but the alternative of edge-to-edge security is even
>> worse.
> I'm fairly sure you don't mean it that way, but just in case...
>
> We'll really be better off not to be talking as if end-to-end
> (or object) and hop-by-hop (channel) security were mutually
> exclusive - "the alternative" sort of implies that.
>
> And there are different hops or channels as well, e.g. if I
> run IMAP/TLS whilst on an IPsec VPN etc etc. Or see the
> discussion between Adrian and Steve Kent on our draft. So
> those are also options and not mutually exclusive.
no, they are not, but having a plethora of security options
available does not mean that, on a pairwise basis, one will
be able to invoke any of them. (Assuming that we are sticking
with mandatory to implement, not mandatory to use).
> One take away from a lot of the snowdonia stuff is that we
> should have well defined interoperable and ideally easy to
> deploy ways to do security at *every* level since every single
> option will work best for someone somewhere.
maybe.
> For example, when the tcpcrypt folks turned up at the IETF a
> couple of years ago I was against it really. That was mostly
> because I figured we already had TLS so why would we want
> another thing that's so similar but partly because they were
> selling it as "better" than TLS. I've now concluded that I
> was wrong about that and am encouraging them as I can.
I wish you wouldn't encourage them. I can easily see confusion
and non-interoperability arising because of the need to choose
between TLS and tcpcrypt.

Steve