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Re: [perpass] Violating end-to-end principle: I-D Action: draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-00.txt

Dave Crocker <dhc@dcrocker.net> Thu, 16 January 2014 20:29 UTC

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Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 12:28:23 -0800
From: Dave Crocker <dhc@dcrocker.net>
Organization: Brandenburg InternetWorking
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To: Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe@cdt.org>, perpass@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [perpass] Violating end-to-end principle: I-D Action: draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-00.txt
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On 1/16/2014 8:38 AM, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote:
> I like how the recent Barnes et al. draft refers to this as "object
> encryption." best, joe


Indeed, channel vs. object protection is long-standing terminology for 
the distinction.

Separately, note that "end-to-end" can refer to different end-points. 
The gateway to an end-users administrative network is a reasonable 
example of an end, for some considerations.

Equally, a mailbox isn't necessary and end-point, when talking about 
applications that interact via email, since the application might have 
additional transit, beyond email.  (That's not hypothetical.  Electronic 
Data Interchange [EDI] demonstrated this point.)

d/
-- 
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net

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