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Re: [perpass] tcpcrypt applicability (Was: Re: Violating end-to-end principle: I-D Action: draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-00.txt)

Dave Crocker <dcrocker@bbiw.net> Mon, 20 January 2014 15:27 UTC

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Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2014 07:27:07 -0800
From: Dave Crocker <dcrocker@bbiw.net>
Organization: Brandenburg InternetWorking
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: Re: [perpass] tcpcrypt applicability (Was: Re: Violating end-to-end principle: I-D Action: draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-00.txt)
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On 1/20/2014 7:19 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> I'd expect that if tcpcrypt were implemented in
> some kernels then it'd be useful in places where you can't
> feasibly use TLS.


what are some examples of when this could occur?

as long as there is speculation about this as a legitimate alternative, 
it would help to have the speculation include plausible examples.

d/

-- 
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net

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