Re: [Pqc] Mapping the state of PQC and IETF

[Sofía Celi <[e-mail]>]

Dear, list,

I think for the moment we should keep the covienient-for-PQC drafts out 
of the list. It is true that they can potentially help PQC migration 
(which has to still be examined and deployed) but they are not 
PQC-per-se; but rather serve other goals such as improving efficiency. 
It think these drafts have to be carefully considered in their 
corresponding WGs. We can potentially create later a list of 
covienient-for-PQC drafts.

Thank you,

On 01/03/2023 06:55, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> Let me give you another example.
> Should the SUIT manifest draft be added to the list because it can use 
> HSS-LMS? In fact, HSS-LMS, as a hash-based signature scheme, fits the 
> firmware update use case well since the size of the signature is small 
> compared to the firmware update itself. With the recent announcement 
> from the NSA in 
> https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071834/-1/-1/0/CSA_CNSA_2.0_ALGORITHMS_.PDF the use of hash-based signatures for software- and firmware-signing is even recommended.
> Still, I wouldn't list the SUIT manifest since you will run into the 
> problem Mike was given below. It is probably more useful to ask each 
> working group how the use of PQC algorithms will impact their protocols. 
> Most groups have looked into this already.
> Ciao
> Hannes
> *Gesendet:* Dienstag, 28. Februar 2023 um 17:08 Uhr
> *Von:* "Kampanakis, Panos" <[e-mail]>
> *An:* "Hannes Tschofenig" <[e-mail]>, "[e-mail]" 
> <[e-mail]>
> *Betreff:* RE: [Pqc] Mapping the state of PQC and IETF
> 
>  > draft-kampanakis-tls-scas, for example, is about reducing the size of 
> the TLS handshake. It conveniently uses PQC as a motivation but there 
> have been many efforts before that tried to accomplish TLS handshake 
> size reduction before and you wouldn't want to list all of them as well.
> 
> Indeed.
> I wish the previous mechanisms worked in the PQ auth context because it 
> is an uphill battle to convince the TLS WG that ICA suppression is the 
> most straightforward option we have.
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Pqc <[e-mail]> On Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig
> Sent: Tuesday, February 28, 2023 6:36 AM
> To: Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth=[e-mail]>; Sofía 
> Celi <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
> Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL][Pqc] [EXTERNAL] Mapping the state of PQC and IETF
> 
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not 
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> 
> 
> Mike, you bring up a good point.
> 
> draft-kampanakis-tls-scas, for example, is about reducing the size of 
> the TLS handshake. It conveniently uses PQC as a motivation but there 
> have been many efforts before that tried to accomplish TLS handshake 
> size reduction before and you wouldn't want to list all of them as well.
> 
> 
> Am 28.02.2023 um 01:16 schrieb Mike Ounsworth:
>  > Wicked, thanks for starting this github page!
>  >
>  > I started this thread asking for, I guess, the converse of this 
> document: IETF (Sec Area) protocols that DON'T need a PQ draft.
>  >
>  > For example: SCEP (RFC 8894) does not itself specify any crypto, but 
> embeds CMS (RFC 5652) and PKCS #10 (RFC 2986).
>  >
>  > ACME embeds JOSE/JWS (RFC 7515) and PKCS #10 (RFC 2986).
>  >
>  > Etc.
>  >
>  > It would probably be a service to the community to document those on 
> the PQUIP github page so that people know that "Do Nothing" is the 
> correct action. Basically, every Sec Area protocol probably needs to be 
> on that page under either "Action Needed" or "Action Not Needed". Since 
> I suggested it, I guess I just volunteered to put in a PR starting that 
> table. Barring $distraction, I'll try and get something tonight.
>  >
>  > ---
>  > Mike Ounsworth
>  >
>  > -----Original Message-----
>  > From: Pqc <[e-mail]> On Behalf Of Sofía Celi
>  > Sent: Monday, February 27, 2023 9:47 AM
>  > To: [e-mail]
>  > Subject: [EXTERNAL] [Pqc] Mapping the state of PQC and IETF
>  >
>  > WARNING: This email originated outside of Entrust.
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>  >
>  > ______________________________________________________________________
>  > Dear, list,
>  >
>  > We have started work on mapping the state of PQC (if any draft or RFC
>  > exists) in the different IETF protocols/WG and IRTF groups:
>  > 
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/ietf-wg-pquip/state-of-protocols-and-pqc__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!aJOUSAk6uCUWekoeQOJ2UzMiGwLV2jwgJF9cfNHTloERjfqjU5rCmcAqqjMkCcu9ThT9UN5nc3Q4sNLmPx61zSs$ <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/ietf-wg-pquip/state-of-protocols-and-pqc__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!aJOUSAk6uCUWekoeQOJ2UzMiGwLV2jwgJF9cfNHTloERjfqjU5rCmcAqqjMkCcu9ThT9UN5nc3Q4sNLmPx61zSs$> to keep track of where everything is at. Feel free to contribute by sending a PR. We hope this list is useful to many.
>  >
>  > Thank you,
>  >
>  > Sofía and Paul
>  >
>  > --
>  > Sofía Celi
>  > @claucece
>  > Cryptographic research and implementation at many places, specially 
> Brave.
>  > Chair of hprc at IRTF and anti-fraud at W3C.
>  > Reach me out at: [e-mail]
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-- 
Sofía Celi
@claucece
Cryptographic research and implementation at many places, specially Brave.
Chair of hprc at IRTF and anti-fraud at W3C.
Reach me out at: [e-mail]
Website: https://sofiaceli.com/
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