Re: [Pqc] Mapping the state of PQC and IETF - ssh

[Alexandre Petrescu <[e-mail]>]

Le 03/03/2023 à 12:25, D. J. Bernstein a écrit :
[...]
> my recommendation is to proceed with immediate post-quantum
> deployment, obviously using open-source software!

But how about openssh saying "WE DO NOT RECOMMEND RELYING ON THIS FORK
IN A PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT OR TO PROTECT ANY SENSITIVE DATA"? at
https://github.com/open-quantum-safe/openssl

Is that capitalized warning something like BSD's capitalized 'NO
WARRANTY' that one is used to?  Or is it more than that?

I am more and more facing oppinions saying that it [risks of not using
stronger crypto like NIST's or ssh's] is not a real problem, for reason
X and Y, where X and Y are that quantum computers are for later, quantum
networking is a just theory, quantum crypto is at risk more than
existing crypto facing traditional but increasingly more powerful
computers, that nobody broke 3DES anyways, that novel quantum-resistant
crypto algos are falling apart one after another, that lengthening the
keys of existing algos is sufficient for more robustness, that the RSA
conference said this or that, etc.

To me, I rather think that _everything_ is at risk until migration to
quantum-resistance is performed.  That includes quirky things like https
to more mundane concepts like simply SIM cards or simply ecommerce or
bank transactions or health record data management - everything.

It's like something that has started and can no longer be stopped.  The
migration, transition, that is.

I dont want to scare anyone, it is just an intermediary step.  It is not
my kind to be FUD or paranoid.

I am not really an expert on the crypto matters anyways.

Alex