Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Allow CONNECTION_CLOSE in 0-RTT (#3440)

[Kazuho Oku <[e-mail]>]

kazuho commented on this pull request.

So the proposed changes are the following two?
* allow CONNECTION_CLOSE in 0-RTT
* use APPLICATION_CLOSE instead of "user_cancelled"?

Assuming that is the case, changes to the transport draft looks good to me modulo the point below. I think my comments to the TLS draft still holds.

> +  the client has Handshake keys.  Under these circumstances, a server SHOULD
+  send a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame in both Handshake and Initial packets to ensure
+  that at least one of them is processable by the client.
+
+* A client that sends CONNECTION_CLOSE in a 0-RTT packet cannot be assured of
+  the server has accepted 0-RTT and so sending a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame in an
+  Initial packet makes it more likely that the server can receive the close
+  signal, even if the application error code might not be received.
+
+* Prior to confirming the handshake, a peer might be unable to process 1-RTT
+  packets, so an endpoint SHOULD send CONNECTION_CLOSE in both Handshake and
+  1-RTT packets.  A server SHOULD also send CONNECTION_CLOSE in an Initial
+  packet.
+
+An CONNECTION_CLOSE of type 0x1d MUST be replaced by a CONNECTION_CLOSE of type
+1c when sending the frame in Initial packets. Otherwise, information about the

Maybe change to "in Initial or Handshake packets"?

I think we need to call out Handshake packets too, because a client cannot tell if it is talking to a legitimate server when it sends a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame using a Handshake packet.

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