Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Allow CONNECTION_CLOSE in 0-RTT (#3440)

Marten Seemann <notifications@github.com> Sun, 16 February 2020 08:47 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Allow CONNECTION_CLOSE in 0-RTT (#3440)
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marten-seemann commented on this pull request.



> +
+* A client will always know whether the server has Handshake keys (see
+  {{discard-initial}}), but it is possible that a server does not know whether
+  the client has Handshake keys.  Under these circumstances, a server SHOULD
+  send a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame in both Handshake and Initial packets to ensure
+  that at least one of them is processable by the client.
+
+* A client that sends CONNECTION_CLOSE in a 0-RTT packet cannot be assured of
+  the server has accepted 0-RTT and so sending a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame in an
+  Initial packet makes it more likely that the server can receive the close
+  signal, even if the application error code might not be received.
+
+* Prior to confirming the handshake, a peer might be unable to process 1-RTT
+  packets, so an endpoint SHOULD send CONNECTION_CLOSE in both Handshake and
+  1-RTT packets.  A server SHOULD also send CONNECTION_CLOSE in an Initial
+  packet.

Could we simplify these 3 points by just saying:
```An endpoint SHOULD send a CONNECTION_CLOSE in all encryption levels that it possesses keys for.```

> +  that at least one of them is processable by the client.
+
+* A client that sends CONNECTION_CLOSE in a 0-RTT packet cannot be assured of
+  the server has accepted 0-RTT and so sending a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame in an
+  Initial packet makes it more likely that the server can receive the close
+  signal, even if the application error code might not be received.
+
+* Prior to confirming the handshake, a peer might be unable to process 1-RTT
+  packets, so an endpoint SHOULD send CONNECTION_CLOSE in both Handshake and
+  1-RTT packets.  A server SHOULD also send CONNECTION_CLOSE in an Initial
+  packet.
+
+An CONNECTION_CLOSE of type 0x1d MUST be replaced by a CONNECTION_CLOSE of type
+1c when sending the frame in Initial packets. Otherwise, information about the
+application state might be revealed. Endpoints SHOULD use the APPLICATION_ERROR
+code when performing this conversion.

What happens to the reason phrase? Can we mandate endpoints to clear it when using the APPLICATION_ERROR?

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