Re: [rtcweb] Summary of ICE discussion

Matthew Kaufman <matthew.kaufman@skype.net> Wed, 05 October 2011 02:51 UTC

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Date: Tue, 04 Oct 2011 19:52:37 -0700
From: Matthew Kaufman <matthew.kaufman@skype.net>
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To: Hadriel Kaplan <HKaplan@acmepacket.com>
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Cc: Randell Jesup <randell-ietf@jesup.org>, "<rtcweb@ietf.org>" <rtcweb@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Summary of ICE discussion
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On 10/4/2011 9:24 AM, Hadriel Kaplan wrote:
>   requiring a more stringent JS trust model seems worthwhile to me.
>

Great idea. Already being discussed elsewhere. Out of scope for both of 
these groups except to note that *if* someone solves the JS trust issue, 
we might be able to relax the ICE requirement when running applications 
that are "trusted".

I wouldn't be adverse to even saying just that in the requirements 
document that explains why ICE is needed.

Matthew Kaufman