Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Wed, 09 November 2011 18:57 UTC

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Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 13:33:50 -0500
To: Geoff Huston <gih@apnic.net>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Cc: sidr wg list <sidr@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] BGPSEC Threat Model ID
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At 3:09 PM +1100 11/5/11, Geoff Huston wrote:
>On 05/11/2011, at 12:34 PM, Randy Bush wrote:
>
>>>  I think the distinction between a leak and something more intentional
>>>  s a matter of policy.  Knowing the policy associated with the
>>>  adjacencies that an AS is leaking over would allow leaked
>>>  announcements to be identified
>>
>>  o We can not know intent, should Mary have announced the prefix to Bob
>
>
>I disagree with this assertion of impossibility. The intention of the routing
>policy databases in their various flavours and incarnations was to publish
>intent and allow others to filter based on intent.

Geoff,

I have been told that the lack of widely available, reliable IRR data 
out side of the RIPE region is due, in part, to a reluctance by 
operators to publish all of these details.  If that is true, then it 
argues against assuming the existence of such data on a global basis.

Steve