Re: [sidr] Burstiness of BGP updates

[Russ White <[e-mail]>]

> We are doing it to protect reachability.

Again:

>> When you're protecting reachability, what are you protecting?
>> Whether or not someone can reach something. I assume that the
>> "something" you're trying to protect reachability to would/must
>> include things where you enter your password.
>>
>> Hence, I look at this entire problem a little differently than
>> simply trying to enforce a small subset of policies, or as a
>> theoretical exercise... If we can't prevent real world consequences
>> with this work, then --why are we doing it?

> We are not protecting your password in clear text on the internet.

I would challenge you to find any statement of mine where I said this
work is about "protecting your password in clear text on the internet."

"The Internet" is not an abstract collection of "things." It is a set of
reachable destinations. People go to those destinations to transact
business. If people reach the wrong destination, they transact business
with the wrong party. If a "security system," can't protect me from
reaching the wrong destination on a system designed to get me to the
right destination, then the security system is, generally speaking, useless.

I do wish I didn't have to have users connected to the networks I design
and work on --it would really make my life much simpler. But then again,
no users, no network, right? I think we sometimes get so lost in the
theory that we forget what networks are actually _for_.

:-)

Russ

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