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Re: [Tcpcrypt] v3 of the charter

David Mazieres <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu> Thu, 01 May 2014 19:18 UTC

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From: David Mazieres <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu>
To: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>, tcpcrypt@ietf.org
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Date: Thu, 01 May 2014 08:04:27 -0700
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Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tcpcrypt/ZANhlw8VNAy73NJezujg1NxFFxk
Subject: Re: [Tcpcrypt] v3 of the charter
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marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es> writes:

>> FWIW, mine too - IMO, the issue of anti-fingerprinting can be 
>> specified without reference to role, in which case whether 
>> simultaneous open is supported or not can be determined in a candidate 
>> solution.
>>
>
> could you propose text?

How about eliminating the paragraph about anti-fingerprinting, and
instead changing this text:

> - An extended API describing how applications can obtain further
>   benefits of the proposed extensions. In particular, the hooks for
>   supporting external authentication will be defined in this
>   document. This will be an informational document.

To the following:

        ... In particular, the hooks for supporting external
        authentication will be defined in this document.  In addition,
        the document shall specify functions that allow control over any
        session parameters such as accepted ciphers or re-use of
        cryptographic material from prior sessions (if the protocol
        supports such re-use) and that help prevent multiple TCP
        Inc. connections from being linked to the same endpoint.

David

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